

Further, the original study observed:

"For all its interest in speculating about how best to formulate successful Confidence-Building Measures, the literature exhibits remarkably little analytic or theoretical interest in exploring how ordinary individuals and groups are affected positively by the particular goals of or mechanisms underlying Confidence-Building Measures. For instance, it simply isn't good enough to assume, as a sizeable proportion of the literature seems to, that knowing 'all about' an adversary's forces and policies will 'somehow' reduce or control 'unwarranted' suspicion about intentions. There is no reference to *how or why* this will transpire. There is merely the intuitive claim that knowing "more" about a potential adversary will correct misperception and alleviate groundless mistrust. However plausible this may seem at first glance, there is no explanation of what the Confidence-Building dynamics are and how they work."¹⁷

It is discouraging to see how apropos these last observations remain after twelve years. The assessment made in the original study remains sound to this day, especially as analysts and policy makers attempt to apply confidence building ideas in new contexts. The disinclination to develop strong conceptual treatments of confidence building is most telling in the failure to produce a compelling causal model for confidence building but it is apparent in other ways, as well. For instance, the literature has not made much of an effort to locate treatments of confidence building in the larger theoretical work of international relations and its debates. Similarly, little effort has been expended in exploring the psychological character of confidence building despite the prominence of the latter in casual explorations of the phenomenon. Most regrettable has been the failure to use the practical experience gained in the CSCE/OSCE

context to reinvigorate the study of confidence building and how it functions.

Conclusion

This chapter has briefly recounted the essential elements in *Confidence (and Security) Building Measures in the Arms Control Process: A Canadian Perspective*, an overview study prepared by the author twelve years ago as a comprehensive introduction to confidence building. Although a number of promising lines of analysis were initiated in that review, the view of confidence building that finally emerged was fundamentally flawed in ways that paralleled the basic weaknesses of the then-contemporary thinking that it represented. As the next chapter outlines, these problems continue to undermine the development of a comprehensive understanding of confidence building, how it works, and how to use it successfully.

The development of the initial review, despite the limitations built into it inadvertently, was a worthwhile exercise in several ways. Some of the basic elements remain useful to this day, such as the typology of CBM categories. In addition, many of the problems identified as weaknesses in the pre-1984 literature continue to trouble most confidence building thinking so their identification is certainly valuable. Least obvious but most important, *Confidence (and Security) Building Measures in the Arms Control Process: A Canadian Perspective* established the conceptual basis on which the transformation view was eventually developed.

ENDNOTES

1. This operational focus is not surprising because many of the professional literature's authors, at various points in their careers, also were negotiators and policy analysts contributing to the confidence building negotiating process. It is ironic, however, that analysts so familiar with process would spend so little time thinking about it.
2. For the texts, see *Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements — Texts and Histories of the*