with limited and achievable objectives, is more likely to work than one that starts out too ambitiously. Therefore, a progressive approach to NCBMs is suggested:

- 1) Tacit measures should be first priority because in many cases they are founded on principles and procedures that have been in place for many years, although not recognized specifically as NCBMS. If these measures are observed by a state, then that state can be seen as being willing to cooperate in maritime matters, and this will also establish a foundation of credibility to build upon in further negotiations. Emphasizing a state's proven respect of the existing "tacit measures" is a potentially useful short term NCBM for creating a positive negotiating atmosphere for more explicit NCBMS.
- 2) The second stage or medium term measures of the NCBM process would be to employ the information and communication measures. Although more explicit in committing a state to certain behaviour, these measures are still largely unintrusive in nature and, as a result, easier for states to accept and implement.
 - 3) The final stage of the NCBM process is the successful implementation of constraint measures. These longer term measures represent the most difficult measures for states to accept because:
 - they are sometimes considered arms control measures
 which some states are unwilling to discuss; and
 - they are seen in some cases as infringing on a state's sovereignty, such as deployment constraint measures.