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to adhere to the NPT and to place their nuclear programmes under full-scope IAEA safeguards. In the Canadian view, such a legally binding commitment to non-proliferation ought to be a condition for nuclear co-operation with non-nuclear-weapon States.

The instances of recent chemical weapons use reinforce the urgency of concluding as soon as possible a comprehensive ban on these weapons. It is encouraging that in the past two years there has been significant progress in the negotiation of such a ban at the Conference on Disarmament. This is in many ways the most technically challenging multilateral arms control negotiation ever undertaken, involving extremely complex provisions for verification. The negotiators must press on with both deliberation and haste. A treaty with carefully defined, detailed verification provisions is important in its own right and also as a model for future multilateral arms control agreements. Care must also be taken to ensure that the Treaty, when implemented, will not inhibit the legitimate peaceful activities of chemical industries, including those in developing countries.

The ambivalent implications for future strategic stability of ongoing technological developments are posed especially dramatically in the area of outer space. The issue is sometimes misleadingly posed as one of preventing the "militarization" of outer space. As a matter of reality, many of the man-made objects now in outer space are there for military purposes and in full conformity with existing international law. The issue is not one of banning all military activity in outer space but one of ensuring that such military activities as occur there enhance strategic stability and international security.

Nevertheless, in light of technological developments over the past decade and the announced policies and research efforts of some Governments, a heightened concern about the potential for outer space becoming an arena for military rivalry is entirely legitimate. Some encouragement can be derived from the fact that the prevention of an arms race in outer space is an agreed negotiating objective of the two leading space Powers. Further, at the Conference on Disarmament, many of the difficult legal and technical issues involved are being clarified.

For the future, it is essential that the 1967 Outer Space Treaty remain in force as the central legal framework for activities in outer space. It may need to be supplemented by additional legal instruments. Continued strict compliance by the USA and USSR with the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty as signed is also in the international interest.

The international community ought not to overlook the possibilities for turning new technologies to the advantage of the arms control and disarmament process. Canada's own PAXSAT studies suggest a considerable potential for the application of space-based remote-sensing technologies to the verification of arms control agreements. Greater attention and work should be dedicated to exploring these possibilities.

By far the most devastating and harmful consequences of military actions in past decades have resulted from the development, deployment and use of conventional