

of government.¹² This phenomenon is illustrated by this paper's description of the adjustments within the Canadian bureaucracy to political and economic developments in western Europe in the late 1980s culminating in the TAD.

This case study can also be said to be typical of Canadian foreign policy-making in that Cabinet ministers held the ultimate authority for the decision to actively pursue the TAD, while the members of the bureaucracy were the sources of most policy positions and were responsible for the implementation. Although, in theory, there was a clear separation of power and responsibility between the Cabinet and bureaucracy, in practice it was a handful of officials in two divisions within the Department of External Affairs and International Trade Canada (EAITC) who played the lead role in positioning Canadian trans-Atlantic interests.¹³ In the process of negotiating the TAD with the EC (including the Member States) and the US it was soon very clear to Canadian officials that, given Canada's relative position of power, it would be impossible for them to stick rigidly to their ideal objective (i.e. a trilateral EC-Canada-US trans-Atlantic Declaration) when presenting their positions to Cabinet members for approval. The form of the TAD (as do most policies) evolved as negotiations progressed and, in the end, the Canadian and US TADs demonstrated a delicate balance of compromises. But lest the impression be given that Canadian politicians had little to do but give their stamp of approval to their officials, it should be pointed out that the TAD was first proposed at the highest political levels by the Germans and the Americans. Once Canada became involved, support from Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, and PM Mulroney was critical in determining the bargaining strengths and influence of the civil servants at EAITC who would ensure Canada's role in the final outcome. The interest taken by the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) in the negotiating process reflected the increased importance accorded to EC-Canada bilateral relations in the Prime Minister's foreign policy agenda. This is a significant development since in Canada the Prime Minister is the primary foreign policy actor. Finally, as is the norm in Canadian foreign policy-making, Parliament did not play a significant role in the development of the TAD.¹⁴

3. SEEDS OF THE DECLARATION: PROSPECTS FOR A NEW TRANSATLANTIC TREATY

i) The US Strives to Create New Links with the Community

In the spring of 1989, officials of the US State Department initiated a review of US bilateral relations worldwide. The branch responsible for European affairs used this occasion to advise senior members of the Bush administration that, with the Community evolving and assuming a more prominent foreign policy role, more attention had to be focused on gaining access to the decision-making process of the