

though the Czech invasion of 1968 and the explicit and tacit recognition of existing European frontiers by the West assure Soviet security interests in a setting of increased European cooperation, they do not assure the internal status quo in Eastern Europe. The CSCE would thus represent an opportunity for cautious movement forward in a continuing quest for unilateral advantage.

A more definite transformation of East-West relations is suggested by the reform trend in Soviet policy. In this case the responses of the Soviet system to its various environments reflect a marked interest in collaboration among adversaries in order to enhance Soviet well-being and security more rapidly. Where the neo-Stalinist and activist tendency is guided by an interest in the exploitation of differences between capitalist states, the reform and collaborative trend is accompanied by a preoccupation with the use of differences within Western political elites, the United States included, for purposes of stabilizing agreement and détente. Neo-Stalinist observers are aware of conflicting trends within Western elites, but they usually paint a pessimistic picture of the balance of forces, arguing that the aggressive and reactionary elements have predominant if not always overwhelming power. The advocate of increased collaboration, however, tends to emphasize the capacity of Western political systems to make realistic adaptations of