> *. . . to achieve the objectives of the Convention, to ensure the implementation of its provisions, including those for international verification of compliance with it, and to provide a forum for consultation and co-operation among States Parties.*

We in Canada, through the Verification Research Programme, have tried to examine in detail some of the key issues with a view to expediting the negotiations. For example, we have provided to the Conference on Disarmament work we have done on procedures for the verification of allegations of the use of chemical weapons and, together with Norway, have put forward a proposal on this subject which gives other participants something "to shoot at" during the negotiations.

We have also been very interested in the machinery that will be created to implement the convention. Knowing that Dr. Keeley of the University of Calgary had a particular interest in the operation of the IAEA, we agreed to assist him in his efforts and, in return, we asked him to direct some of his energy to considering whatever lessons — both positive and negative — might apply in other arms control contexts. Some two years of co-operation have produced a commendable document of which you have received copies, and, at the same time provided the impetus for this conference.

Also assisting us on these issues have been staff from the University of Saskatchewan. One such study in which Bruno Schiefer (present with us) and Ron Sutherland (not present) took part involved an analysis of the skills and personnel which would be needed by an inspectorate in order to perform its role in monitoring compliance with the obligations of the convention. A rather compressed version of some of the material from that systems study has been distributed to you in the form of a presentation that Dr. Sutherland has delivered in various forums. I should add that Dr. Sutherland is not present with us because he is following up the earlier "qualitative" study with an attempt to put together a "quantitative" model which will highlight personnel and financial resource implications of setting up the Inspectorate. As you will appreciate, this is not an easy task in that there are so many unknowns, particularly about the size and nature of the civilian chemical industry that will be subject to data reporting, routine inspections — and now possibly a new variant, "ad hoc checks" — quite apart from any challenge inspection requirements. Although Dr. Sutherland is absent, there are others here present who are either involved in the same study, or involved in similar work in other countries, and they will certainly have much to contribute to our discussions. I trust they will also benefit from our collective insights.

Perhaps enough has been said for the time being in setting the scene for the remainder of our time together as we consider "IAEA Safeguards as a Model for Verification of a Chemical Weapons Convention." The topics of the