

broad and general survey will suffice. But a more intimate acquaintance with the topography of the theatre, and a knowledge of strategy, are required, in order to determine the further questions of what points in that theatre are most important as steps toward the object, and what are the chances of gaining possession of them.

As an example of the way in which, after admitting all these various elements of the question of selecting a theatre, a balance may be struck and a decision formed, let us take the case of the campaign of Marengo.

While Moreau operated from the Rhine on the Danube, Napoleon was to attack the Austrians in Italy. They were besieging a French garrison in Genoa; they had advanced and occupied the passes of the Alps on the Italian side from Lake Maggiore down to the junction of the Apennines endeavoring to force their way into France across the Var, which river was defended with inferior numbers by Suchet. Thus the Austrian front extended along the whole Italian frontier of France.

Napoleon's objects were to deliver the besieged garrison of Genoa, and to strike a decisive blow against the Austrians in Piedmont and Lombardy.

The Austrian lines of communication with their base and of retreat led from the various points of their front to Mantua and Verona, and owing to the geographical features of North Italy, all the roads by which they could gain those cities were compressed literally into the space between Milan and Piacenza. If Napoleon could throw his army across that space he would effect a double object—he would cut the communications of the enemy, and, by forcing them to concentrate for action, would deliver Genoa.

The object of his campaign, then, was the space from Milan to Piacenza; and his first task was to choose the line by which to advance to it.

North Italy is divided into three unequal portions by the Po and the Apennines. And as it would be manifestly unwise to advance on both sides of either of these obstacles, Napoleon had to determine which of the three intervals of space he would operate in.

The space between the Apennines and the sea being narrow, was favorable to an inferior force; and Napoleon's army was inferior in number to the Austrian. The region was mountainous, and therefore the French army, strongest in its infantry, would there meet the enemy, whose great superiority lay in cavalry and artillery, under the most favorable conditions. But successes here must be slow; the Austrians, when pushed back, would constantly be reinforced through the passes of the Apennines; and in retiring, they would still cover the siege of Genoa. If beaten, they would be driven along their proper line of retreat to the shelter of their fortresses on the Mincio and Adige.

In the space between the Apennines and the Po three fortresses existed, those of Turin, Coni, and Alessandria, each a stumbling block in the way of an advancing army. This, too, was the centre of the Austrian line, and a centre of a line can manifestly be reinforced by the rest more easily than either extremity. The fortresses would bar the way to the French long enough to give the Austrians time to concentrate. By holding the passes of the Apennines they would prevent the French force on the Var from advancing to the relief of Genoa; and, if defeated they would still, in falling back, cover the siege, and would, as in the former case, retire on their proper line of retreat.

In both these regions, then, the Austrian army would interpose between Napoleon and his object, and, in the second case, with great advantages for opposing his advance. Moreover, it was a part of his plan that his insufficient numbers should be recruited by a detachment sent from Moreau's army on the Danube. The road from thence to the French frontier of Italy was long and difficult, and the junction of this co-operative force could not be hoped for in time to be effective.

In the remaining space between Switzerland and the Po, the Austrians, besides being far weaker in numbers than at any other part of their line, were most widely extended; and no fortresses existed here. This space, therefore, in which lay the most direct road to Milan, offered the most favorable conditions; and once at Milan, the main army might be joined by the corps sent by Moreau, which, crossing Switzerland, would descend the St. Gothard Pass to Bellinzona.

But this region was also by far the most difficult of attainment of the three, sheltered as it was by the Alps, the rugged passes of which, though but weakly garded, seemed to forbid the passage of an army. The other parts of the frontier were crossed by the roads which formed the regular communications between France and Italy, while in this northern corner the high mountains covered with perpetual snow, and passable only by steep and perilous tracks, seemed an insurmountable barrier. But beyond this obstacle Napoleon beheld his object ready for his grasp. Disregarding difficulties, he pushed his troops over the Alps, and was at Milan almost before the Austrians knew of his presence in Italy. Joined there by the detachment of the army of the Rhine, he guarded the passages of the Ticino with half his forces facing westward, and with the rest crossed the Po and occupied the road to Piacenza. He was too late to save Genoa, which had been forced by famine to capitulate; but, on the other hand, the Austrians, unwilling to abandon the siege when on the verge of success, delayed the retreat of the investing force; which, by a more rapid march, might have held the south bank of the Po against the French, and secured the road there by which to regain Mantua. Thus the capture of Genoa only secured the defeat of the Austrians by depriving them of their one chance of escape. Cut from their line, they were forced to fight at Marengo with their faces to their proper rear, and when defeated, nothing remained for them but to capitulate.

But the selection of a line is not decided always on military grounds alone. Political considerations frequently complicate the problem. That which is of most importance is the effect which the war may have on the policy of nations whose territories are between, or adjacent to, the frontiers of the belligerents. In the wars of the French Revolution, Austrian armies were forced to hold the line of the Rhine, when good military reasons would have dictated a different course, because of the effect which would certainly be produced on the German powers bordering on the river—Baden, Wurtemberg, etc., by leaving them uncovered. In the campaign of Jena, the Prussian army would have found the Elbe a secure and convenient line of defence, but Saxony and Hesse-Cassel would be thus left unprotected, whereas Prussia, by covering their territories with her army, would secure their co-operation and add their contingents to her numerical force. For that reason she was induced to take up a line which was the cause of all her disasters. At the outset of the late war with Russia, the first design of the

Allies was to engage their armies in the defence of Turkey, south of the Danube; and when the Turks, single handed, beat off the invaders, it seemed most natural that all the Allied forces should combine to carry the war beyond the Danube. But in such a case it became of primary importance to consider what side Austria would take, because her position on the flank of what would then be the theatre of war gave her the power of decisive action. Her policy was a question for the Allied Governments to consider, and the result of their deliberations was to transfer their armies to the Crimea.

## THE FENIAN RAID OF 1866.

BY MAJOR GEORGE T. DENISON, JR.

[CONTINUED.]

In planning his campaign, therefore, it will be seen that Col. Peacock was at Chippewa on Friday night with 400 regular infantry and a battery, and that he expected to be reinforced in the morning early, at Chippewa, by the St. Catharines volunteers, Lt. Col. Currie, the 10th Royals, Major Boxall, and 130 men of the 47th, under Lieut. Col. Villiers, in all about 1500 men; at Port Colborne he had the Queen's Own, Lieut. Col. Dennis, and the 13th Battalion, Lieut. Col. Booker, and the York and Caledonia Rifles, in all about 850 under command of Lieut. Col. Booker; and as above stated the information was that the enemy were roughly entrenching at Frenchman's Creek, and were marching or likely to march towards Chippewa, and that their force was between 1000 and 1500 and likely to be reinforced before morning.

Colonel Peacock, although an officer who had never seen service in the field, is nevertheless a thoroughly educated military man, having obtained with the highest honors a first class certificate in the senior class at the Military College at Sandhurst. He is a strict disciplinarian, active, intelligent, and vigilant, cool and calculating; and although a man of undoubted pluck, is nevertheless too good a soldier to risk the loss of his command for the sake of winning the doubtful reputation of bravery by a reckless carelessness in the management of his men.

Being, as I have said, a thoroughly educated man, and of decided military talent, he at once perceived the difficulty and probable danger of attacking on two lines of operations. He had several plans good and bad open to him.

1st. He might have marched by the river road to Port Erie and sent Lieut. Colonel Booker by the Grand Trunk Railway and along the river to Frenchman's Creek, and have cut off the Fenians and attacked them in concert. This was the plan afterwards proposed by Lt. Col. Dennis and acceded to by Capt. Akers. This plan could only have originated in an unmilitary mind, and one perfectly unacquainted with the military art. The first great principle of war is "always to oppose the mass of your army to fractions of the enemy;" and another great principle, a deduction from the first, is "always to act upon interior lines"—that is to say, upon the inner lines, so that your army may concentrate upon any one point before the enemy can concentrate there. Of course this is but to prevent the application of the first principle against yourself.

Now in this plan both these principles would be violated. Colonel Peacock's force and Lieut. Col. Booker's would be acting upon exterior lines. The Fenians being between them, or upon the interior lines, by marching towards Chippewa or Port Col-