is entitled may be ordered to be sold under the provisions of R.S.O., c. 137, s. 3. This case, however, does not determine what the effect of the conveyance of the infant would be when made under the provisions of the Act; and we take it that it by no means follows, because the court may have power to order a sale, that it can also enable the infant to bar the entail. On the contrary, we should think it open to very serious doubt whether, under subsection 2 of section 3, the conveyance of the infant, even though made under the authority of the court, could have the effect of barring the entail. That subsection provides that "no sale, lease, or other disposition *shall be made against the provisions of a will or conveyance by which the estate has been devised or granted to the infant* for his use." When by a will or conveyance an estate tail only is vested in the infant, it would seem at least to be arguable that a conveyance by the infant cannot bar the entail; otherwise it would be a conveyance "against the provisions" of the will or conveyance, and, therefore, a conveyance which the infant cannot make. It is quite possible, therefore, that a conveyance by an infant tenant in tail would only have the effect of conveying the estate subject to the entail, and not the wider effect of a conveyance by an adult under R.S.O., c. 103, s. 3. At all events, we should think it would be prudent for a purchaser under any order authorizing such a conveyance by an infant tenant in tail to take the opinion of the court before accepting it as a sufficient bar of the entail.

It would appear that whether the infant could effectually bar the entail in the land sold or not, the purchase money derived from the sale of an estate tail would be subject to the same limitations as the land sold was subject to at the time of the sale; at least that seems to be the intent of R.S.O., c. 137, s. 8. This might raise an interesting question, how the estate tail in such purchase money could be subsequently barred by the infant on his attaining his majority.

MR. MCCLIVE'S letter, which will be found in another column, is deserving of the attention of the committee charged with the reconsolidation of the Rules. It may be that the committee has no power to do more than recast the Rules as they now stand, without additions or variations, except such as