

o far exceeds that of any other nuclear-weapon state, that it is difficult to give credence to the argument that an interim testing halt by the two of them would threaten their security unless all the remaining nuclear-weapon states immediately followed suit. Someone must take the first step, and the two super-powers are in the best position to do so.

Even if such an agreement were for a fixed trial period, at the end of that time it could be reviewed to determine whether it might be further extended or be transformed into a permanent agreement including all nuclear-weapon states. Such an interim agreement should be open to all states, and should contain measures to ensure that its terms are fully honoured and that nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes do not confer weapons-related benefits.

Although existing nuclear arsenals pose the most immediate threat, the world continues to be haunted by the danger that nuclear weapons will spread to other states. If more resolute efforts are not made to avert this danger, we shall have uttered away completely whatever chance there still may be of eliminating the threat of nuclear destruction.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its associated system of IAEA safeguards continue to be the basic instruments of the non-proliferation system and the most appropriate framework for international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Some positive steps have been taken since the NPT Review Conference of May 1975, but much that should have been done in support of the non-proliferation objective has not been done. The treaty's obligations apply to all states — to nuclear-weapon states as well as non-nuclear-weapon states. While non-nuclear-weapon parties undertook not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear-explosive devices, the nuclear-weapon states undertook, in return, to pursue early negotiations in good faith towards nuclear disarmament. It is to be regretted that the nuclear-weapon states have not done more to fulfil their part of the NPT bargain. An effective non-proliferation system is in the interest of all states. It must be fully effective and to serve the interest of all states the non-proliferation system must entail restraints on vertical as well as horizontal nuclear proliferation.

An important achievement has been the growth in the number of the treaty's adherents from just over 80 at the time of the Review Conference to about 100 now. Parties to the treaty now include most all the most highly-industrialized

countries and the great majority of developing countries. By forswearing the acquisition of nuclear-explosive devices and by placing all their nuclear activities under IAEA-administered safeguards to verify this commitment, this impressive group of states from all parts of the world has clearly rejected the notion that either the possession of nuclear weapons or the retention of an option to acquire them is a guarantee of security in some way essential to national sovereignty and the reinforcement of national prestige. This encouraging perspective, however, is not yet shared by certain other states advanced in nuclear technology or in the process of acquiring that technology. These states should reassess their reasons for not making a firm commitment to the non-proliferation objective, either by adhering to the NPT or in some other equally binding and verifiable way.

NPT review

In its Final Declaration, the NPT Review Conference urged that "in all achievable ways" steps be taken to strengthen the application of nuclear safeguards as the reasonable and necessary condition for international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Canada has taken this appeal seriously and has made it clear, in the negotiation of new bilateral nuclear co-operation agreements and in the renegotiation of others, that Canadian nuclear assistance is solely for peaceful non-explosive purposes.

Measures taken in the IAEA and among suppliers to reinforce and broaden the application of nuclear safeguards, the safeguards agreements concluded by a number of countries with the IAEA in the past year (especially their explicit exclusion of any explosive use and strengthened provisions for the application of safeguards to technology transfers), the detailed study being given to the need for greater care and more stringent controls in the use of the most sensitive parts of the nuclear-fuel cycle — all these have been Canadian objectives. But there is still a need for further strengthening and broadening the scope of nuclear safeguards. Safeguards will not be fully effective until they cover all peaceful nuclear activities of all states. Canada itself has willingly accepted the application of safeguards to all of its own nuclear industry; universal acceptance of such safeguards would provide the soundest basis for international nuclear co-operation.

The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones could help curb the spread of nuclear weapons and strengthen the security

Nuclear assistance for peaceful non-explosive purposes