

SECRETDISCUSSION

3. The crux of the German manpower problem is the shortage of fully-fit German men aged 17 to 37. In other categories the manpower position is relatively easy.

4. The over-all quality of the German Army has already been considerably diluted by increasing use of less fit and overage Germans and of foreigners in order to keep actual strength approximately equivalent to reduced table of organization requirements.

5. German units at the front continue to fight well. This may be attributed to a policy of using only combat-fit men in combat roles even while using less fit or foreign personnel in every conceivable non-combat role.

6. If, between 1 April and 1 October, the German Army continues to suffer losses at a rate equivalent to our estimate for the period since 22 June 1941, 900,000 replacements must be found in order to maintain present strength. The probability is that the loss rate will be greater during that period. Most of these losses will occur among fully-fit Germans aged 17 to 37, a category in which there are no appreciable reserves available.

CONCLUSIONS

7. Germany cannot replace further heavy losses of fully-fit Germans aged 17 to 37.

8. Under heavy attrition Germany cannot long maintain the fighting efficiency of her Army combat units.

## A P P E N D I X

THE GERMAN MANPOWER POSITION, 1 APRIL 1944

1. Annexes. Our detailed estimates are shown in the annexed tables, as follows:

"A" - Status of German manpower, classes 1926-1897, and strength of the Armed Forces, as of 1 October 1943.

"B" - Status of German manpower, classes 1927-1884, and strength of the Armed Forces, as of 1 April 1944.

"C" - Intakes and losses, 1 October 1943 to 1 April 1944.

"D" - Table of organization requirements of the German Army, as of 1 April 1944.