

representative of the Associated Press, purporting to outline the attitude of the State Department as described to him by 'unimpeachable authorities':

The United States Government was ready to back Eisenhower to the limit in whatever steps he found necessary to eliminate threats to success created by the controversy between the two French generals. Eisenhower was expected to tolerate no de Gaullist or other French activities which would in any way:

- (a) delay execution of projected Allied operations;
- (b) jeopardize vital Anglo-American and French supply lines in North and West Africa;
- (c) undermine the morale of French officers and men commanded by General Giraud under General Eisenhower or militate against their effective participation in projected trans-Mediterranean operations.

Full British cooperation was assured in this respect, no matter what the effect on General de Gaulle's status or ambitions.

Because the time element was of vital importance General Eisenhower had accepted tentatively the compromise division of French military authority and spheres of jurisdiction which had been worked out in response to his insistence that General Giraud must retain command in North and West Africa and that General de Gaulle must drop his efforts to effect a purge of officer personnel in General Giraud's forces.

General Eisenhower had no intention of trespassing on French sovereignty, but it was inconceivable that Allied powers should submit to any control by local administrators that might increase the danger to Allied troops or adversely affect Allied military effort.

The North African controversy had developed into a contest for complete control of French military forces and a persistent effort on the part of General de Gaulle to replace with his own adherents all officers previously associated with the Vichy Government. There were many indications that controversial activities of the two-headed Committee of National Liberation had already undermined the spirit of the French army. Boisson, always openly anti-German, who had repelled General de Gaulle at Dakar, was reported to have been forced to resign, and apparently General Juin, Chief of Staff of the French army, intended to resign too. Officers of all ranks had become uncertain of their allegiance, and propaganda efforts were affecting the loyalty of some of the soldiers of all French armies.

Kirke Simpson concluded by saying that the British hoped General de Gaulle would soon settle down to loyal team work against the enemy, but were concerned at his policy of showing how rough he could be with themselves and the Americans and remembered that he had tried (a) to cause a rift between the two allies, (b) to cause friction in Syria, and (c) that he had first claimed to be