

tion, George the Fourth and Charles the Second. In the case in question, the conclusive proof of the superior probity of the American Legislature is the small amount they raise from the people and the large surplus that remains in the Treasury.

The author has, with some candour, allowed that corruption is about as rife in the English Legislature as in the American, and instances the speculation in railway matters; but when he excepts the House of Lords, and terms them the "soul of honour," his memory appears to be strangely oblivious upon this point.

Has he forgotten the celebrated card-cheating case some years ago, in which one of the "souls of honour" figured as a principal? Surely he must recollect that a member of the same illustrious body, an ecclesiastic of noble birth, was once brought up to a London Police Office on a charge of unnatural crime, and forced to fly the country. If parallel instances could be named in the American Senate, how triumphantly they would be brought forward as arguments against republican institutions! Has he never read about Nicholas Suisse, the valet of the old marquis, the intimate friend of that pillar of Church and State the Quarterly Reviewer — natural consequences as such instances are of the hereditary principle?

Is it not true that in old times the great estates were held of the Crown by tenure of military service, and that the lords have made use of their political power to escape from this and every other public obligation? Was not the excise first placed upon the nation in lieu of commuted payments due by holders of lands to the Crown; or, in other words, "a tax upon