last, the number of writs issued from the different Divisions have been as follows:—

	Q.B.	C.B.	Chy.	Excess in Chy.
1881.....	676	662	982	306
1882.....	1979	1958	2694	715
1883.....	2283	2284	2833	549
1884.....	2027	2015	2774	747
	6965	6919	9283	2317

It will thus be seen, that the excess of business in the Chancery Division over that in either of the other Divisions, has, in three years and a-half, amounted in the aggregate to 2,317 actions. In addition to actions commenced by writ, there are also to be added a large number of actions for partition and administration, commenced by notice of motion, and which have usually been prosecuted in the Chancery Division, and of which no account is taken in the returns referred to. Thus with the same staff of judges, and about the same staff of officers, as the other Divisions, the Chancery Division has, according to these figures, been doing at least one-third more work, during the past three years and a-half.

We believe London is the only city in the Province, in which the writs issued in the Chancery Division, have not largely exceeded those issued in either of the other Divisions, during the past year. For instance, it appears that at the following places, the writs issued were as follows:—

	Q.B.	C.P.	Chy.
Brantford	39	39	49
Ottawa	46	47	153
Kingston	26	25	96
Belleville	66	64	171
St. Catharines	43	44	54
Guelph	35	35	103
Hamilton	126	126	234
While in London the figures were	252	252	137

The reason for this singular preference of Middlesex suitors for the Queen's Bench and Common Pleas Divisions, we are at a loss to conjecture.

Assuming that the effect of the new Rule will be to equalize the number of cases in the various Divisions, we may be sure of this, that it will inevitably lead to the transfer of a great many actions from one Division to another. All actions commenced in the Chancery Division required to be tried by a jury will have to be transferred, according to the practice established, to what is called very erroneously a "Common Law Division," because the Chancery Division has no machinery for trying actions by jury. Then again we expect it will be found necessary to transfer from the so-called "Common Law Divisions" to the Chancery Division many actions in which equitable questions arise—because the judges of the so-called "Common Law Divisions" prefer not to try them. If carried to any great extent, the practice of transferring actions will be found to be fraught with not a few inconveniences, and have a tendency to induce mistakes in the conduct of proceedings, and may possibly create difficulties in the way of tracing up proceedings, after the lapse of a few years.

This practice of transferring actions, for any such reasons as we have mentioned, seems opposed to the intention of the Judicature Act. That Act assumes that each Division shall be competent to try every action that is brought in it. It virtually declares that a specific performance action is not one for the exclusive consideration of the Chancery Division, neither are actions for assault and battery, or libel, or seduction, peculiarly within the province of the so-called "Common Law Divisions," and yet every time an action of assault and battery is transferred from the Chancery Division to the Queen's Bench Division, or a specific performance action from the Queen's Bench Division to the Chancery Division, the principle of the Act appears to be violated. The only cause of transfer the Act seems to recognize is the equalization of business in the different Divisions. When an action in the Chancery Division is required to be tried by a jury, instead of