

External Affairs

elections of 1930 and 1935. I see no reason why an individual should not change his mind, if he is convinced he is wrong.

When I returned to Canada I stated publicly in many places that a foundation could not be built on sinking sand, and pointed out that there was no foundation in China upon which to build. I pointed out there was no hope of restoring peace and unity in a country as large as China, particularly when it was as corrupt and totally incompetent as China was.

I remember saying in the house in 1949 that I believed the Peiping government should be recognized and given a seat in the United Nations. By doing that we would not have been approving or disapproving of the type of government in that country. Such action would not have been an expression of that kind on our part. It would have been only a recognition of the acknowledged fact that here were a people who had come into power, as had happened in many other countries, a people who had control of the councils of the country, who had put some reforms into effect, and who had obtained a measure of obedience from a people who represent almost a quarter of the world's population.

I believe that at that time such a move would have been comparatively easy. But it is a much different story today. It would be most difficult if not impossible, in view of the situation in Korea and the fighting that is taking place there, to do it now.

The question is often asked whether it would have made any difference if communist China had been recognized. That is a question no one can answer. It seems to me there is no use elaborating upon it, because no one knows the answer. I think all will agree however that conditions could not very well be any worse. I appreciate that nothing can be gained by reviewing that situation now.

I believe I was right in speaking as plainly as I could on the occasion I have indicated. I attended a Rotary Club luncheon today, and heard a gentleman refer to the definition of a realist. When I was in China I tried to be a realist. It is said that at the dinner table the optimist says, "Please pass the cream"; the pessimist says, "Please pass the milk"; but the realist says, "Please pass the jug."

While in China I felt I was looking at the situation as realistically as I could. I have a high regard for those hon. members who have expressed contrary opinions. It was the hon. member for Vancouver-Quadra (Mr. Green) who cautioned us not to be sentimental, not to be emotional. I listened to Madame Chiang Kai-shek when she was here in 1943. At that time I was one of her staunch supporters.

[Mr. MacKenzie.]

Indeed I almost reached the point where I felt I should go home, mortgage my farm and give her what I had. Of course I did not go to that length. I changed my mind when I reached China and saw the situation there. When I saw the conditions in China I felt I could not possibly support an outfit like that, one which obviously was lacking in democracy, Christianity and liberty.

I will say this, that I have a high regard for the people who expressed an opinion different from mine, and said that the nationalist government headed by Chiang Kai-shek had fought communism for years, and had fought Russian aggression for years. But it is my opinion that the nationalist government in China, which has been headed for the last 22 years by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, has done more to create and spread communism than all other factors combined. I have nothing to say about the personal integrity of Chiang Kai-shek, but if you are the manager of a ball team you are responsible for the behaviour of its members. In the same way with the government of Canada, if the Minister of National Health and Welfare (Mr. Martin) goes wrong—

Mr. Martin: No danger of that.

Mr. MacKenzie: —the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) of this country has to take the responsibility. The nationalist government headed by Chiang Kai-shek must accept responsibility for what has been done.

I do not wish to say anything further at this time about the merits or demerits of the former regime in China. British policy is based on the belief that the main reason it was driven from China was that it no longer commanded general support and the only way it could ever return to Peiping would be by a major conflagration, involving large-scale intervention by outside powers or by the United Nations as a whole on the mainland of China. In other words, all the hopes for the former regime returning to power are based on the failure of the western powers to achieve a peaceful settlement.

Economic aid is vitally necessary, but instead of being used to bolster up discredited regimes, it should be accompanied by social planning to remove the grave injustices of a system in which the great mass of the peasants are in the grip of landlords and usurers. Economic aid should not be used to interfere in the internal affairs of backward and undeveloped countries, but remedy of social abuses should be made a condition of its being granted. And it must be clearly stated what is the democratic way of life.

Peace is not in sight and troublesome days lie ahead. The last five years have been