

array radar in North Dakota that was originally installed as part of a planned active, anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system.

These developments were generally supported in Canada, and the Canadian government had no difficulty in agreeing to a more passive approach to the air defence task. Such a policy fitted the altered strategic circumstances and also cost less than maintaining a full, active defence effort. In fact, Canada was scarcely involved in the new missile warning and space surveillance function, contributing only a limited number of facilities such as the SPACETRACK cameras in Cold Lake, Alberta, and St. Margaret's, New Brunswick. "There is, unfortunately, not much Canada herself can do by way of effective direct defence that is of relevance against massive nuclear attack,"² the defence white paper noted in 1971. The main thrust of Canadian policy towards NORAD in these years was to try to preserve Canadian sovereignty within the NORAD system by working towards a reconfiguration of air defence boundaries so that they corresponded to the national borders and by establishing region operations command and control centres (ROCCs) in Canada. In the mid-1970s, the government also decided to re-equip Canada's air forces with a new interceptor, but this was prompted by pressure from the NATO allies to do more in defence in general and not by a strong belief on the part of the government or the country at large that Canada should do more in NORAD. The new interceptor decision put an end to one nagging irritant, however. It enabled the government to give a firm undertaking that it would phase out the last remaining nuclear weapons on Canadian soil — the Genie rockets serving as armament for the CF-101 (Voodoo) interceptor. This was in fact accomplished on July 5, 1984. (The CF-18 purchase involves an initial order for 138 aircraft; deliveries began in October 1982 and are expected to be completed in September 1988.)

3. The Recent Years to the Present: The Changing Environment

In the last seven or eight years Canada has faced a more complex and demanding situation in the field of North American air defence, partly because of the growing obsolescence of present radar networks and related military systems, but also because of global strategic and political developments and U.S. responses to them. Whatever Canada's own perceptions of the world, this country has to aim at maintaining mutually satisfactory arrangements with the United States. In the air defence area, this means dealing with American perceptions of the threat as much as with the threat itself.

From about 1978 to 1981, the main cause of concern about North American air defence was the prospect of replacing outdated equipment. Canada was going ahead with the plans to purchase a new fighter aircraft, as already mentioned, but this country and the United States encountered problems of obsolescence in many other areas. A joint United States-Canada air defence study (JUSCADS) was undertaken in 1979, prompted, as unclassified extracts from an executive

² *Defence in the 70s: White Paper on Defence*, Minister of National Defence, Ottawa, August 1971, p. 6, Information Canada (catalogue no. D3-6/1971).