

There is another serious omission in the Soviet resolution. This omission is possibly a consequence of the fact that the Soviet resolution is obviously a re-issue of a document put before the League of Nations many years ago. The U.S.S.R. resolution takes no account of the United Nations and of its role in maintaining peace and restraining aggression, especially Article 42 which provides for sea, air and land enforcement action. As it stands, the U.S.S.R. resolution would make it illegal for a member of the United Nations to take any of the enforcement measures which it might be expected to take as a result of action by the Security Council. This may, of course, be a mere oversight in the drafting of the U.S.S.R. resolution. It is, however, further evidence of the fact that this resolution has been presented without adequate reference to the practical situation which exists in the world of 1950.

I might add that I am somewhat at a loss to reconcile the Soviet resolution with some of the remarks made by the Soviet Foreign Minister when he spoke in this Committee on Saturday, October 28. Referring to the speech delivered by Marshall Stalin on February 9, 1946, Mr. Vishinsky expounded for us the Leninist distinction between just and unjust wars. Within the category of just wars, he said, were to be included wars against capitalist slavery. This theory of the distinction between just and unjust wars, which takes no account of which country is the aggressor and which country is the victim of attack, seems to be at wide variance from the theory which is embodied in the Soviet draft resolution. It is not for me to determine which theory is accepted more wholeheartedly by the Soviet delegate. What I must point out, however, is that they are different and incompatible.

There is a further and even more important reason why we are sceptical of the value of attempting to define precisely aggression before it occurs. Modern war is so various and complicated that a list of aggressive measures which are specified and forbidden might merely lead an intending aggressor, as the French Delegate pointed out so skilfully, to concoct a mode of aggression which would fall outside these prohibited measures. Then, ipso facto, he becomes technically innocent, though in every other respect guilty.

Nevertheless, we sympathize profoundly with the wish of states which feel themselves threatened to bolt as many gates against a possible aggression as they can. For this reason we have looked with sympathy at the resolution which has been submitted by the Delegation of Yugoslavia. At one point it, too, attempts to set up an automatic criteria for determining the aggressor. For the reasons which I have mentioned already we are doubtful of the wisdom of this paragraph in the Yugoslav resolution. On the other hand, we can see merit in the attempt contained in the earlier part of the Yugoslav resolution to establish a procedure by which an act of aggression could be brought, with the least possible delay, to the attention and conscience of the world. The provisions whereby both states engaged in hostilities should be obliged to make a public statement proclaiming their readiness to issue a "cease-fire" might tighten the mesh which we have been endeavouring to close around any would-be aggressor. As this part of the resolution stands at present, I am not sure whether we would find it entirely acceptable. It