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EXTERNAL AFFAIRS DEBATE

would hope the position taken by Canada would be a position that would be of benefit to the peace and stability of the whole world.

"We should not attempt to make decisions that do not have to be made. The position at this time is that we are not, under present conditions, contemplating diplomatic recognition of China. We have not, and I do not think we should say at this time or at any other time, that there may not be a situation in the future when a Government we do not like, a Government the complexion of which is quite contrary to all our democratic ideals, and a Government which according to the information we have obtained by hearsay - of course we have to rely for our information on what we get by hearsay - seems to have been guilty of many things that we would not condone, may nevertheless have to be recognized. There are other Governments with whom we have at the present time diplomatic relations who, we think, have done things we could not condone. But they are the Governments of those lands and the only Governments with whom any dealings in respect of their populations can be had.

OPEN MIND

"I think we all hope that there will be, even between these apparently incompatible worlds, the free world and the world made up of countries with communist regimes, some kind of a modus vivendi which will in fact allow us to live, and allow them to live. That would take place, without our interference, without our approval, without our responsibility, in any way in the lands we regard as unfortunate, because they are under such regimes. If we do not look upon that as possible, we then have to look upon this state of cold war as something of very long duration, with always the possibilities of its flaring up into something worse than a cold war.

"... And now I do venture to say that the policy of the Canadian Government at the present time is to keep an open mind as to whether or not at any time, under any conditions which may develop in the future, there should be recognition of the Government which at that time will exist as a matter of fact in China. . . . We should keep an open mind as to when if ever conditions may be such that it will be in the interest of peace and stability in the world to recognize diplomatically whatever Government happens to be in control of the forces of China.

"That I think is the preferable position; but in the meantime whenever there does appear to be an opportunity to remove some of the tension from the international situation by discussions, by meetings and by discussions like that which are called for April 26 in Geneva, I think it is only realistic to feel that the Government which is in fact in con-

trol of affairs in China has to be there if there is going to be anything accomplished that will produce beneficial results."

The C.C.F. Leader, Mr. Coldwell, interjected that there seemed to be an inference in press reports from overseas that the Prime Minister "gave his approval to United States military aid to Pakiistan", and invited the Prime Minister's comment on that point. Mr. St. Laurent replied:

"I refused to express any opinion. I said that as far as we were concerned no such question could arise, because we had pledged to the NATO organization everything we could do in the form of aid and forces to maintain peace in the world, and that no Government that expected to remain the Government of Canada should ask for more than had been pledged by us to the NATO organization. I did also say that I felt quite satisfied in my own mind that the aid provided, or that might be provided, by the United States to Pakiistan was not designed to be used against India, and that I felt quite sure that had there been any impression that it was going to be used against India there would not be one per cent of the United States people who would have supported it. . . ."

MR. PEARSON

In touching on the Berlin Conference, Mr. Pearson said, in part:

"After a careful examination of all the reports of the Berlin conference dealing with Germany, Austria and the general subject of European security, it seems clear that the conclusion I put forward on January 29 holds true today. There has been no evidence of change in the basic foreign policy objectives of the Soviet Union. At Berlin, Mr. Speaker, the same record was played, although it was played somewhat more softly and for that I suppose we should give thanks.

"One of the foreign policy objectives of Soviet Union has been to split the European allies, and indeed other allies, from the United States of America; to crack the solid structure of Western unity. Mr. Molotov at Berlin made it abundantly clear that this was certainly one of his principal aims. But we can all take satisfaction out of the fact that he failed in achieving that aim. Indeed, the Russian tactics served to strengthen, I think, the unified approach of the Western delegation to international problems. . . ."

In his reference to E.D.C. the Secretary of State for External Affairs said, in part:

"We in Canada have, I think, felt and demonstrated sympathy and understanding for those in Europe who have demanded full time for consideration of E.D.C. In view of their history we have understood their hesitation. But while recognizing the necessity, the very real necessity, for caution and prudence, we may feel also over here that there comes a time when in certain situations failure to act may in the