

agreement over whether to involve representatives from other Asian states in these discussions. While other viewpoints might be helpful and educational, this might dilute the focus of the Canadian-Korean effort.

Ultimately, the discussion refocused on several key questions: Was it best to ignore or engage the North Korean government on security issues? How could we interest them? What do they want? What forum could we all rely upon to manage this expanded set of contacts? Most participants appeared to believe that efforts ought to be expended to engage as wide as possible a variety of North Korean officials while maintaining a very wary guard. Efforts expended now might bear security management fruit within the next several years despite the current, gloomy environment.

As in the previous workshop, this one came to a close with a concluding overview of Dr. James Boutillier. He noted ten issues that characterized the content of the workshop's papers and the larger subject matter addressed by the workshop. Many of the issues ultimately had to do with understanding context.

Outsiders would not grasp the nature of security problems in the region nor how to handle them if they did not understand the history and culture of the region. The legacy of hostility between many regional actors was profound and coloured relations in a variety of ways. Some regional states saw the world in ways very different from their neighbours, making peaceful relations quite difficult. Contrasting notions of sovereignty compounded these historical, psychological, and cultural differences with many Asian states exhibiting a sense of state versus personal rights and state versus international obligations that conflicted with Western ideas. This made them less accessible to external pressure and hostile to outside efforts to change them. This carried over into differing conceptions and understandings of arms control, its language, its assumptions, and the negotiating cultures that are associated with it.

The security environment was further confused by the growing problem of proliferation with increasingly sophisticated weapons systems spreading throughout the region. This was a function, in part, of economics and technology strategies in some regional states. In short, the security environment was complex, non-Western in a number of key but poorly understood ways, and the product of a host of factors that did not necessarily lend themselves to easy control. The task of improving this environment would require thoughtful understanding and context-relevant elaborations of security management approaches already seen to enjoy some success in other areas of the world. Non-regional actors might help but the principal motivation would have to come from within.