

Ross suggested that Blair had not addressed the beliefs of many strategists. First was their concern that the Soviets want to develop the ability to make a pre-emptive strike in time of crisis. If the Soviet Union were attempting to achieve this strategists would not accept Blair's aim of a secure second-strike. Second, many conservatives wanted to have a secure counterforce capability. Blair's prescription would not allow for this objective. While Ross did not espouse these views himself, he believed that they must be dealt with in any effective political debate.

Ross also noted that having vulnerable command systems undermined the stability of the relationship between the superpowers. Furthermore, he felt that there was a lack of political awareness of how urgent this problem had become.

General Milstein described Soviet strategic policy. He noted that the Soviet Union had declared a policy of no-first-use and maintained that it did not entertain the possibility of a limited nuclear war. He rejected the view of conservative strategists, as described by Ross, that the Soviet Union was planning to achieve the capacity for launching a pre-emptive strike and argued that if military targets were attacked, civilians would also be affected. Milstein asserted that the deterioration in the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union was extremely dangerous from a nuclear standpoint. He believed that addressing the political problems was a necessary pre-requisite to solving the military and technical problems of nuclear war. He also insisted that security could not be one-sided and that for one side to have nuclear superiority was destabilizing. He cited Gorbachev's proposal to remove nuclear weapons, in three stages, by the year 2000.

Marco Carnovale drew attention to the differences between the intercontinental strategic situation and that in Europe. He pointed out that there were several irreversible reasons why the European command system was uncontrollable, and he gave a European perspective on what he considered the shortcomings of Bruce Blair's argument for a survivable, secure, command system.

According to Carnovale the European nuclear strategic situation differs from the intercontinental situation in eight essential ways. First, the European defence system has several dual capable systems, in which most weapons can be used for both short-range and medium-range purposes, and dual-key systems, where it is difficult to determine which authority has the final say over launching, the host country or the United States. Second, command and control in Europe must inevitably be more decentralized than at the intercontinental level. Third, the level of complexity of European arsenals is necessarily high. Fourth, Europe's geographic proximity to the Soviet Union requires short reaction times. Fifth, the political and military goals of the allies frequently diverge, even in peacetime. Sixth, the European weapons systems are characterized by what Paul Bracken referred to as "uncontrollability", in his 1983 book *The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces*. While Bracken had argued that this