

the stipulated age, to declare and adjudge that a valid marriage was not effected or entered into, provided that the parties had not after the ceremony lived together as man and wife.

This section had its origin in an Act passed in 1907. In 1909, the Act was amended by adding as sub-sections of the original of sec. 36 the provisions now found in sec. 37, in a slightly amended form. In their original form, the operation of these added sub-sections was, no doubt, confined to actions falling under the section itself; but, in 1911, the statute was recast, and the sub-sections in question are removed from the original section and given the dignity of an independent statutory enactment. As they stand now, the sub-sections commence by a wide provision, applicable not only to the statutory action provided for by sec. 36, but also to any case in which the intervention of the Court is sought for the purpose of declaring a marriage void. "No declaration or adjudication that a valid marriage was not effected or entered into shall in any case be made or pronounced upon consent of parties, admissions, or in default of appearance or of pleadings, or otherwise than at a trial."

I cannot narrow this, as contended by Mr. Watson, and make it applicable only to cases where one of the contracting parties was under age, leaving it open in all other cases to have the marriage declared to be invalid upon consent or upon default of defence. It follows that the sub-sections which are appended to this wide declaration are equally wide in their application, and confer upon the Attorney-General the right to intervene in all cases in which a declaration of the invalidity of a marriage is sought.

Nor can I yield to the alternative argument presented by Mr. Watson. Sub-section 4 provides that ten days' notice of trial shall be given to the Attorney-General; sub-sec. 5, that "the Attorney-General may intervene at the trial or at any stage of the proceedings, and may adduce evidence and examine and cross-examine witnesses in like manner as a party defendant." Mr. Watson's contention is, that this allows the Attorney-General to intervene only at the trial, and does not allow the making of such an application as this, to stay the action.

Two answers, I think, are apparent. In the first place, there is nothing to restrict in any way the meaning to be attributed to the word "intervene." Mr. Watson contends that this litigation is the mere private concern of the parties litigant. The Legislature has thought otherwise. The public are concerned; and the Attorney-General, as representing the public, is author-