

assistance could no longer be regarded as binding; except in this particular however, the agreement would be regarded by USA as continuing in force. It was USA view that the ultimate objective should be to bring back the DRVN to full observance of the Ceasefire Agreement and even to effect, if possible, a strengthening of the Geneva Accords. He said that a precise statement of this objective had been included in an earlier draft of President Kennedy's letter to President Diem. Its omission from the final version was not repeat not however significant and this continued to be USA goal.

7. In two subsequent messages, I will be reporting further upon my conversation with Harriman with particular reference to his views on the possibility of a "Geneva Conference" on Vietnam and prospects for the next meeting of the three Lao Princes.

[A.D.P.] HEENEY

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*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance
et de contrôle pour le Vietnam*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Commissioner, International Commission for Supervision
and Control for Vietnam*

TELEGRAM Y-677

Ottawa, December 21, 1961

CONFIDENTIAL. CANADIAN EYES ONLY. OPIMMEDIATE.

Reference: Your Tels 258 Dec 16, † 257 Dec 15† and our Tel Y-666 Dec 14. †

Repeat for Information: Delhi, London, Washington, Paris, NATO Paris, Laosdel Geneva, DM/DND, CCOS, CGS, DGPO.

By Bag Warsaw, Moscow from London, Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

SOUTH VIETNAM – USA MEASURES

Our general attitude of sympathy for broad USA objectives in Vietnam and of concern about dilemma with which these measures may face us in Commission was indicated in our telegram Y-648 December 2.⁵⁴ We think USA policy of avoiding formal notification of specific numbers is likely to ease our difficulties in Commission, and we hope that South Vietnam will not reconsider their present attitude in this regard. We remain concerned however about precision of details being supplied to press in Saigon. While we recognize that this publicity is probably intended to deter DRVN and encourage RVN (and to strengthen public support in USA), it seems to us likely also to facilitate presentation to Commission of incontrovertible evidence that CFA is being violated and hence to increase difficulty of avoiding a citation against SVN. Such a citation, if decided without regard for reasons for USA measures, could of course give grossly false impression with which we would not wish to be associated.

2. While fully recognizing that USA aid is sent to compensate for already large DRVN intervention in RVN, we consider that as member of ICSC we are obliged to do what we can to preserve the ICSC for as long as it can perform a useful role and to protect budding settlement for Laos. It would not seem best course in these circumstances to resort simply to argument that a breach by one side justifies a breach by the other. To use that argument would in our

⁵⁴ Voir/See document 764.