

States technical units, particularly signalmen, in Korea in order to maintain liaison between the ground and air forces. Mr. Wrong and I agreed that this would appear to be only the beginning of a process which perhaps gradually, but inevitably, would involve the commitment of United States ground forces of all arms and services to the fighting in Korea.

D.V. LEPAN

21.

PCO

Extrait des conclusions du Cabinet
Extract from Cabinet Conclusions

TOP SECRET

Ottawa, June 29, 1950

KOREAN SITUATION

9. *The Prime Minister* reported on further developments in the Korean conflict and on the possible steps that might be taken by Canada to support the United Nations resolution and the lead taken by the United States.

10. *The Cabinet*, after further discussion, noted the report of the Prime Minister and deferred decision on any further statement to be made or action to be taken with respect to the Korean situation pending consideration in the light of further developments.⁸

⁸ La conclusion du Cabinet comprenait la note infrapaginale suivante :

The Cabinet Conclusion contained the following footnote:

N.B. The Prime Minister met with the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Minister of National Defence and the Minister of Trade and Commerce on Thursday, June 29th, at 11.30 p.m. and again on Friday, June 30th, at 10.00 a.m. in his office in the House of Commons. A draft statement was approved covering a possible contribution by Canada to aid United Nations operations in Korea (naval units). This statement was read in the House by the Prime Minister at 10.30 a.m., Friday.

(Memorandum, Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister, July 4, 1950 [Documents 11 and 31]; unrevised *Hansard*, Friday, June 30, 1950 p. 4459)