

matter with great interest and some concern. Incidentally, an essential party to any cease-fire of this kind would be the communist government of China, which, though a non-member of the United Nations, would have to be invited, I assume, to participate in the Security Council deliberations if they were to have any chance of success. Whether this particular government would accept such an invitation is another matter.

While it is not proper for me to comment on United States policy in this matter which is now being considered by Congress, I think I can say that any move or proposal within the United Nations or through diplomatic channels which could serve to achieve the purpose as stated in the President's message "to improve the prospects of peace in the area" will be warmly welcomed by the parliament and by the people of this country.

Before the Korean armistice I expressed on more than one occasion in this house the view of the Canadian Government that Formosa should be neutralized as far as possible while hostilities continued in Korea. We thought then, and we think now, that the final disposition of Formosa should be subject to be discussed at a conference on Far Eastern problems which at that time we thought might be held after the cessation of fighting in Korea. That was the view adopted by the Political Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on January 13, 1951. Despite developments since then, it remains the view of the government that the final disposition of Formosa should be dealt with by international negotiation, at a conference, if you like, on Far Eastern problems, if one could be held. Certainly, in any decision regarding the future of Formosa the wishes of the people there, which are often forgotten in discussions of this matter, should be a primary consideration. Pending such a decision I think that a strong case can be made for the neutralization of Formosa both in order to prevent any assault upon it by communist forces and also so that it will not be used as a base for invasion of the mainland.

In this area of tension and danger a distinction can validly be made between the position of Formosa and the Pescadores and the islands off the China coast now in Nationalist hands. The latter are indisputably part of the territory of China; the former, Formosa and the Pescadores, which were Japanese colonies for fifty years prior to 1945 and had had a checkered history before that, are not. I suggest therefore that the considerations which recommend the neutralization of Formosa and the Pescadores do not necessarily apply to the coastal islands so close to the mainland and a hundred miles or so away from Formosa. Therefore, I welcome that part of the President's message which looks to the redeployment of the Nationalist forces which are now in these islands. "Some of these forces", the President's message states, "are scattered throughout smaller off-shore islands as a result of historical rather than military reasons directly related to defending Formosa".

My understanding of the basis of a truce or cease-fire is that neither the Nationalists, the government of China which we recognize, nor the Communists need be asked