

a state had so recently been committed was unrealistic. The words of Mr. Schuman, the French Foreign Minister, were symbolic of the general spirit evident among the non-Communist delegates at San Francisco. He said:

"We have seen the rigid controls and restrictions which various treaties have imposed on the vanquished in the past. This method has failed completely. The Allies, weary and disunited, soon relaxed the prohibitions which were first evaded and finally contemptuously and arrogantly flouted. All that survived was a deep-seated rancour in the vanquished loss of prestige for the victors, and finally a new danger of war... What good is it, actually, to sign peace treaties if we permit to be established in the minds of men the belief that war has become inevitable, inevitable because our governments wish or accept it? It is our duty not only to make known our desire for peace but to create belief in this desire, to convince all men of good faith within our countries and outside our frontiers that we place peace above all selfish national considerations as well as above special interests and our ideological preferences... France is thus acceding and signing the treaty proposed to us because it conforms with these principles. She is however aware of certain imperfections as well as risks which it implies. We are constantly forced to choose between risks; we choose those which appear to us to be the least serious and most reasonable ones."

There were present at San Francisco other delegates who not only were not satisfied with the treaty, but who were not prepared to compromise on a single point in the interests of unity. Mr. Gromyko represented the U.S.S.R. and this unbending resolve to have no compromise. His arguments were repeated by the representatives of Poland and Czechoslovakia. The Soviet representative maintained at San Francisco the procedural stand which for four years prevented the summoning of a peace conference - that is, preparation of the treaty by the Council of Foreign Ministers, on which the Soviet Union would have the veto power. This procedure would have ensured a treaty acceptable in all its terms to the U.S.S.R. or there would have been no treaty. Aside from ignoring the just claims of countries which had suffered under Japanese aggression and which had contributed men and material to the defeat of that aggression for equal representation in the preparation of the treaty, this procedure would probably have left Japan without a treaty just as Austria has been left without a treaty.

The Soviet representative presented a number of substantive objections to the treaty as well. He stated bluntly both at sessions of the Conference and in a press conference which he held on the day of the signature of the treaty: "The American-British draft is not a treaty of peace but a treaty for the preparation of a new war in the Far East". This, of course, may be the Russian view. Forty-eight sovereign nations said it was a treaty of peace. Mr. John Foster Dulles, as chief architect of the treaty, and a man to whom I wish to pay my respects for his months of arduous and exacting work, - speaking for the United States Government, did not treat this charge lightly. On the closing evening of the Conference, he said:

"In answer to all the insinuations and accusations that have been made on behalf of Soviet countries here,