

the adjacent area. I am not sure that we can reconcile these two - our interest in world peace with the purposes behind their intervention - but we must try; and we must try by some more practical and effective means than mere public statements of good intentions and pious hopes.

During this period, when the peace of the world will be in balance, and when we shall be walking on the edge of a volcano which is rumbling alarmingly, we must not look for easy and spectacular results. We must realize that the Chinese Communist leaders, schooled in the tactics of public abuse which have long been part of the Soviet method of diplomacy, many of them completely ignorant of the Western world, are not likely to give us visible or audible help - will, in fact, make our task harder by vilifying us with scorn and slander and misrepresentation. But we need not give way to despair or to a fatalistic acceptance of something that is regarded as inevitable, and about which, therefore, nothing can be done, except to arm.

There is no reason, on the side of the free democracies, why the efforts which are now being made through the United Nations to localize and then end the war in Korea, should not succeed. We must, therefore, make it crystal clear - by our words and, more important, by our policies - that if they do not succeed, the responsibility will lie where it belongs; in Peking and in Moscow.

If, as we trust, these efforts do succeed, the immediate danger of a Third World War would, for the moment, be removed. That would not, however, mean that we could rule out of calculation the possibility of such a war breaking out later. The materials for a fire would still be there; and there would still be madmen about, with matches.

The Soviet Union already possesses the capability to wage a major war at any time. Its policies, moreover, show that it is willing to take the risk of provoking one, even though it may not deliberately desire one. At the present time, the Soviet Union possesses a great preponderance of power on land. On the sea it would be able seriously to interrupt allied lines of communication by the use of its submarine fleet, and by other means. The greatest military weaknesses of the Soviet Union are in the air and in its relative deficiency in atomic bombs. The Soviet Union would probably wish to reach a higher degree of preparedness, especially for air and atomic warfare and to augment its economic potential, before becoming engaged in hostilities. The possibility that this cautious and delaying attitude is the basis of Soviet foreign policy must be weighed against the temptation to take advantage of the passing opportunity offered by relative Western weakness; against the apparent willingness of the U.S.S.R. to take chances which may lead to war, and against the bellicose and inflammatory tactics of the Cominform.

These tactics, leading to aggressive war in Korea, as well as the expansionist nature of Soviet foreign policy generally, provide an incentive, and a necessity, for western re-armament and closer co-operation. The effect of this re-armament will become increasingly