

between now and the Denver G-7 meeting, with other interested parties and sources of expertise. Taken together, working group themes such as those recommended here should readily be presented by the Minister as a means of advancing the sustainable development agenda of the Arctic Council. If asked to state which are the most promising and pressing, in my opinion it would be (a) *climate change* so as to address the particular preferences of the United States, (b) *children of the Arctic* to launch a regional programme of sustainable development, and (c) *communications strategy* to help knit it all together and project the Arctic interest outwards.

To turn now to a longer-term perspective, the Standing Committee's draft report on Canada and the circumpolar world is replete with recommendations that bear on the Arctic Council and Canada's performance within it. The report should give a strong uplift to the Canadian effort to make the most of the Council. Two matters of particular importance have not however been addressed by the Standing Committee. The first concerns the resources required to make a success of the Arctic Council in the long haul.

The AEPS has been based on the coordination and redeployment of existing national assets. With very few exceptions, it has not seen the injection of new money. The March 1997 meeting of senior Arctic officials has confirmed what most expected for the Arctic Council: that there will be no new money for it either, notwithstanding the commitment of the Eight to broach the more challenging and potentially costly agenda of sustainable development. The projects proposed here for Arctic Council working groups should not entail any early requirement for significant new resources. Piggy-backing and recombination of available assets should do the job. But new resources including new money will have to be found if the Council is to move beyond study and standardization to action and especially pro-action on sustainable development. Now is the time to start strengthening the Arctic Council's capacity for action.

Even if the Eight were to become more liberal in the provision of resources as the affairs of the Council acquired greater standing at the political level in some or all of the circumpolar countries, there is sure to be a continuing gap between the ends and the means of sustainable development in the Arctic. To help narrow the gap over time, the EU and non-Arctic states such as China, Germany, and Japan could now start to be drawn into the work of the Council. Already the EU and within it Germany has a growing presence in the network of regional institutions, most notably in the Barents Euro-Arctic Regional Council. Japan has interests in Arctic marine transportation, and could well be associated with the work of the Arctic Council in this and other areas. China, which has extensive permafrost in its northern regions, is already a participant in the International Arctic Science Committee. It is also looking ahead to superpower status in the coming century.

In each of these instances there is an opportunity for Canada not merely to build a circumpolar dimension into its bilateral relations, but to help bring new resources to the Council in due course by starting now to encourage significant extra-regional actors to join in the work of sustainable development in the Arctic. There are difficulties here that extend well beyond a reluctance within the Eight to admit others into the affairs of what some still regard as a private