themselves, with, for example, the UN in an oversight role. Others have provision for direct hands-on action by the third party. In all cases, the "peacekeepers" are reliant on the information provided by the parties when it comes to determining numbers of personnel, weapons, locations of mines, etc.

The track record has been mixed. Generally speaking, the operations in El Salvador and Cambodia have gone well. Angola has been a dismal failure to date, and Somalia has seen mixed results. Large areas of the Somali countryside have been rehabilitated while in certain of the cities, especially Mogadishu, pockets of anarchy remain. Authorities are trying to learn from these experiences and avoid some of the same pitfalls in Liberia, Mozambique and Rwanda. The jury is still out, but at the very least, concepts are being developed and experience gained. More importantly, the idea that practical, real arms control and disarmament should be part of settlements is a significant breakthrough.

Peace Enforcement Missions. With respect to arms control and disarmament and the enforcement aspect of peace operations, there is a common perception that this is a new role, particularly for the United Nations. While this is understandable, it is, in fact, not the case. The UN operation in the Congo in the early 1960s involved, inter alia, a disarmament aspect when the mandate was extended to the forceful expulsion of mercenaries from the separatist province of Katanga once it was determined that the UN would support, indeed enforce, the concept of a single unified state. In the intervening years, this aspect, enforcement, has been nascent, but, with the end of the Cold War and the flexibility displayed by the permanent members of the Security Council, it could be possible again, given the right set of circumstances.

We saw in Chapter VI a description of a peace enforcement operation, UNOSOM II, one aspect of which involved various disarmament measures. For the reasons described, that effort has not been successful to date. The SecretaryGeneral has, however, gone beyond the voluntary arms control aspects of peacekeeping missions, and the ill-fated attempt in Somalia, to ruminate on the idea of using peacekeepers, in some circumstances, in a peace enforcement role specifically in support of an arms control agreement.

The theme was introduced in October 1992 when, in his report New Dimensions, he made specific reference to enforcement in the section entitled "Integration: Disarmament in the New International Environment." In that section he picked up on the concept originally introduced in his report An Agenda for Peace. In New Dimensions, he makes a direct reference to "another domain of conflict resolution where the use of disarmament measures may be required: peace enforcement." He made two points in that context. The first was that enforced disarmament, such as the measures being undertaken with respect to Iraq under Resolution 687, should not be confused with the measures arrived at through negotiation. Nevertheless, he went on to say, "let us resolve that, in the face of grave violations of disarmament agreements or of other threats to peace, this Organization will be ready to act in accordance with its responsibilities under its Charter."

Beyond that, he was introducing for the first time the idea of using military forces to ensure adherence to an arms control arrangement freely entered into by a party or parties but which they subsequently violated. In terms of synergies, it is this possible use of peace enforcement operations in support of arms control and disarmament that is most relevant to this study; however, it remains to be seen if the right combination of circumstances will appear and allow the UN to pursue this idea.

The United Nations Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Another aspect of arms control and disarmament enforcement was brought into sharp perspective when the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 687 on April 8, 1991, in effect dictating the terms for the end of the