

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

agreement on the elimination of chemical arsenals. Now it is up to the United States and the NATO countries to show their political will, realism and high sense of responsibility. Then this year, 1987, would see the commencement of general and complete chemical disarmament.

These are the comments our delegation wished to put forward in connection with the distribution in the Conference on Disarmament of the foreign policy section of the statement of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, which contained important new proposals on the limitation of the arms race, disarmament and confidence-building.

Another positive fact in our view is that from the very beginning of the disarmament process we have been conducting a dialogue with the Federal Republic of Germany on chemical weapons. Asking it more vigorous and productive would be a promising contribution to the elimination of the chemical threat both in Central Europe and with a view to the universal prohibition of these weapons.

However, one has to see that the process of their elimination cannot be an automatic one. There still exists the risk of the launching of a new dangerous round of chemical armaments.

Our therefore cannot arise to the so-called "dual solution" which is one branch demands the elimination of chemical weapons and, at the same time, the deployment of binary weapons. Not will the necessity of Europe benefit from the individualistic position hiding behind the theory about the allegedly limited and purely deterrent capacity of chemical weapons. Doubts are raised also by the means of a dual inspection regime imposing criteria that are stricter for some countries than for others.

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(Mr. Choussier, Czechoslovakia)

We therefore deemed it necessary to respond to the situation that had been created in a joint appeal by the Committee of Ministers addressed first Moscow in all States as well as to the Conference. Not to take steps that would complicate the conclusion of a Convention. Not to delay chemical weapons on foreign territory and to remove them from where they have already been deployed. This applies to Europe as well as to all other continents. It would, after all, be neither logical nor acceptable if one part were working for the optimum solution of the complex problem of verification and the other were preparing the modernization of chemical weapons and yet further complicating such verification.