

4. I am to request, however, that consideration be given to the ancillary troops and services required for the Airport area based upon the recommendations contained in para. 5 of the letter under reply and that detailed requirements be submitted with your further recommendations.

5. Finally, I am to confirm that the action referred to in para. 17 (b) of the Joint Operational Plan No. 1<sup>1</sup> is also contingent upon the Plan being placed in effect.

R. B. G[IBSON], Colonel  
D.M.O. and I  
for Chief of the General Staff

CWC

102.

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

Ottawa, June 5, 1941

SECRET

21. REAR-ADMIRAL NELLES, in answer to an enquiry by the Prime Minister, said that the Navy were not altogether happy about the defence of Greenland. They had as yet received no detailed information as to measures which the United States were taking.

As to the proposed convoy escort base at St. John's, Newfoundland, the Admiralty now planned a substantial increase in the force to be based there. The base would be an R.C.N. undertaking, and Commodore Murray would be in command. Of the thirty destroyers perhaps eight would be Canadian and Canada would probably supply all of the intended twenty-four corvettes.

22. THE CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF, speaking for the Army, stated that coast defence measures were proceeding pretty well according to schedule and there would be no delay in manning defence works as they were completed. In this connection it was recommended that authority be given for the employment of an additional Canadian infantry battalion in Newfoundland.

23. MR. RALSTON described the present disposition of Canadian troops in Newfoundland. There was one Canadian battalion at St. John's, and

<sup>1</sup>Partie du premier plan interarme des opérations relatives à Terre-Neuve; ce plan, à l'instar du premier plan canado-américain de 1940 (sur lequel il se fondait), était destiné à faire face à l'éventualité où la marine britannique ne contrôlerait plus l'Atlantique et où l'Amérique du Nord serait exposée à une invasion. Ces plans ne furent jamais appliqués et furent bientôt remplacés par de nouveaux plans fondés sur l'hypothèse que la Grande-Bretagne continuerait à contrôler l'Atlantique et que les États-Unis entreraient en guerre. (Voir la section 5 c i)

<sup>1</sup>Part of Joint Operational Plan No. 1 related to Newfoundland; this plan, like the "Joint Canadian-United States Plan No. 1-1940" (on which it was based) was intended to take care of a situation in which the British Navy no longer controlled the Atlantic and North America was exposed to invasion. These plans were never put into effect and were soon overtaken by new plans based on the assumption that Britain would continue to control the Atlantic and the United States would enter the war. (See Section 5 c i)