lent preference, and that the assignee in bankruptcy of a member whose seat had been so sold could not recover back debts paid to other members out of the proceeds.—*Hyde* v. *Woods*, 94 U. S. 523.

Grand Jury.—An indictment for burglary committed in a building owned by a corporation was found by a grand jury, two of whose members were stockholders of the corporation. *Held*, no ground for quashing the indictment.—*Rolland* v. *Commonwealth*, 82 Penn. St. 306.

Husband and Wife.—A husband and wife are jointly liable for a trespass committed by the wife in his absence, but by his order.—*Handy* v. *Foley*, 121 Mass. 259.

Indictment.—1. An indictment for murder "by firing a pistol," not showing how the deceased was injured by such act. *Held*, bad.—*Shepherd* v. *The State*, 54 Ind. 25.

2. A statute provides that any person who having a husband or wife living, marries another person, "shall, except in the cases mentioned in the following section, be deemed guilty of polygamy." The following section excepts persons whose husband or wife has been absent for seven years, and is not known to be living. *Held*, that an indictment on the statute need not negative the exception.—*Commonwealth* v. *Jennings*, 121 Mass. 47.

Insurance (Fire).—A policy of insurance on buildings was conditioned to be void from the time that the property insured should be levied on or taken into possession or custody under any proceeding at law or in equity. An execution was issued and delivered to the Sheriff, on a judgment rendered in a proceeding to enforce a mechanic's lien on the buildings; and the sheriff advertised the buildings for sale under the execution, on a certain day, without taking possession in the meantime, and before the day, the buildings were burnt. *Held*, that the insurers were liable.—*Manufacturers' Ins. Co.* v. *O'Maley*, 82 Penn. St. 400.

Insurance (Life).—1. A condition in a policy of life-insurance, making it void if the assured shall "die by his own hand, sane or insane," takes effect if he kills himself while wholly bereft of reason.—*De Gogorza* v. *Knickerbocker Ins. Co.*, 65 N. Y. 232.

2. A child, though of age, has as such an insurable interest in the life of his parent.—*Reserve Mutual Ins. Co.* v. *Kane*, 81 Penn. St. 154.

Jury.—1. In an action by a wife to recover damages for selling liquor (beer) to her husband, a juror testified, on the *voir dire*, that he thought the business of making and selling beer was a "perfect nuisance, and a curse to the community;" that he was bitterly opposed to it, and would do all in his power, except raising mobs, to break it down. *Held*, that he was incompetent to act as a juror.—*Albrecht* v. *Walker*, 73 Ill. 69.

2. At the trial of a civil action for conspiracy, the defendants having been previously convicted on an indictment and imprisoned for the same conspiracy, a person who has expressed an opinion that one of the defendants has been sufficiently punished, and who has signed a petition for his pardon, is incompetent as a juror.—*Ashbury Ins. Co.* v. *Warren*, 66 Me. 523.

3. The drinking of intoxicating liquor by a jury, even in a capital case, does not of itself vitiate their verdict.—*Russell* v. *The State*, 53 Miss. 367.

4. If the record in a criminal case recites that the jury were "duly sworn," it is sufficient; but if it purports to recite the oath and does not follow the statutory form, it is error.—*Miles* v. *The State*, 1 Tex. N. S. 510. So if it does not show that they were sworn at all, but merely that they were "empaneled."—*Rich* v. *The State*, ib. 206.

Landlord and Tenant.—The owner of land who forcibly enters thereon, and ejects, without unnecessary force, a tenant at sufferance, who has had reasonable notice to quit, is not liable for an assault.—*Low* v. *Elwell*, 121 Mass. 309.

Indictment.—An indictment for larceny of bottles of brandy is not sustained by proof that the prisoner drew the liquor from casks into bottles which he took with him for the purpose.—*Commonwealth* v. *Gavin*, 121 Mass. 54.

Larceny.—The stealing, at the same time and place, of several articles belonging to several persons, is but one offence, and a conviction of larceny of one of such articles is a bar to an indictment for larceny of another.—*Wilson* v. *The State*, 45 Tex. 76.

Malicious Prosecution.—If A. makes a false and malicious charge against B, by reason whereof B is arrested and indicted, A is liable