

phenomena are the result of unvarying laws once arbitrarily impressed upon the universe. This school, however, except in so far as the primal origin of these laws is concerned, may consistently be classed in the genetic division.

This last-named general class does not possess the number or variety of special sects found in the other, and in all their essential tenets its adherents may be regarded as practically at one. Though apparently of modern origin, the genetic school is in reality as old as the fully developed mind of man. There have always existed the two antithetical ways of looking at the world, and no age has been wholly without adherents to both of these schools. But there are reasons in the nature of things why the teleological habit of thought should, down to within a quite recent period, have maintained an overwhelming supremacy over the genetic habit of thought.

The only philosopher who seems to have clearly perceived the true nature of this fundamental antithesis and attempted a systematic analysis of the principles upon which it rests, is Immanuel Kant. In his celebrated "Antinomies" ("Kritik der reinen Vernunft," s. 304), and the profound discussion that follows them, he has laid down the foundation in psychology, where it properly belongs, for a thorough understanding of this most vital and practically important condition of human thought. His "theses" and "antitheses" differ only in the character of the examples given from the primary postulates of the modern teleologists and genetists, respectively, and his choice of terms by which to characterize the defenders of these propositions, while they are not those which either party would now select, are perhaps as little objectionable to the one as to the other of these parties.

He called the one the *dogmatic*, the other the *empirical* view of the world, but in his time and country the former of these terms had not acquired the stigma which has since been gradually fastened upon it, and meant a very different thing from that which Douglas Jerrold defined as "puppyism full grown;" while as to the latter, the practice of opposing empiricism to quantitative scientific determination has also principally grown up since his day. Still, as if somewhat unsatisfied with this word, he sometimes employs a substitute for it, and calls this mode of thought the "critical" or "sceptical" method.

In using the term "dogmatic" as applicable to the teleological school, Kant doubtless had in view the fact, so apparent to all, that it was this school that assumed to teach philosophy, being greatly in the ascendancy; and, in the words "empirical," "critical," and "sceptical," he no doubt recognized the tendency of a few minds at all times to revolt against the prevailing conceptions, examine their assumed principles, and subject them to mechanical and numerical tests, and to logical criticisms upon rational grounds. For he declares that, in favor of accepting the former, or dogmatic, view of things, there exist three principal arguments: 1, that derived from a *practical interest*, since upon it appear to rest the claims of religion and morality; 2, that derived from a *speculative interest*, since by its aid the entire field of speculation can be compassed by the mind, and the conditioned directly derived from the uncondi-