

to attack on two occasions. A visit to Ottawa by Congolese leader Patrice Lumumba left the impression that his "attitude as regards occidental countries and the Soviet bloc is still equivocal and warrants careful study," and that he was personally "vain, petty, boorish, suspicious and perhaps unscrupulous" (Document 17). The instructions for the Canadian delegation to the fifteenth session of the General Assembly noted that, "Recent months have seen not only a serious deterioration in international relations, but also a disturbing resort to extreme language, irritability and rocket rattling on the part of some countries." This, the instructions went on to say, posed "a grave challenge to the prestige and authority of the United Nations," and it was "perhaps more than ever before, imperative to recall the high purposes and principles of the organization. It is especially desirable for the Canadian Delegation to stress Canada's strong support for the United Nations" (Document 96). At the year's end, External Affairs reviewed the situation, and again strongly affirmed Canada's commitment to the UN's peacekeeping efforts. Concerns about the organization and operation of the United Nations force were, however, tactfully expressed to Hammarskjöld by the Canadian Permanent Representative, Charles Ritchie (Documents 39 and 40).

Throughout 1959, Canada had maintained its stand that the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos should not be reconvened. Despite the ongoing turmoil in Laos, this issue remained in abeyance, so far as Canada was concerned, throughout most of 1960. In October, however, it again came the forefront of Canadian policy discussions. Canada supported efforts in the UN to have Laos and Cambodia declared neutral, but was hesitant when Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru once again called for the reconvening of the ICSC. Indian officials were assured that Nehru's proposal was being given "urgent and sympathetic consideration in Ottawa" (Document 534) but the Canadian conclusion was that "the reactivation of the I.S.C. in Laos at present would not appear to be practicable" (Document 539).

The impact on Canada of the situation in Cuba during 1960 was felt mainly in the area of bilateral relations with the United States, rather than in the larger fora provided by the United Nations and NATO. Canadians were eager for better relations with Latin America generally, as demonstrated by Prime Minister John Diefenbaker's extremely successful visit to Mexico and Green's tour of South America. The government, fully supported by External Affairs, wished to maintain cordial relations with Cuba and to increase trade, without intending this stand as an endorsement of the Castro regime. Canadian concerns over Castro's policy of nationalization were high, and Canadian exports of military equipment to Cuba were carefully regulated. At the same time, however, Canada deliberately took a "very moderate" tone towards Cuba, in contrast to the United States, whose protests were considered by Ottawa to be excessively "vigorous and stiff." This, it was hoped, "would leave us free to play an independent role should the situation deteriorate seriously" (Document 578).

Early in July, President Eisenhower wrote a personal letter to Diefenbaker, stating that "We are facing a serious situation in the Caribbean which is obviously inviting Soviet penetration of the Western Hemisphere in Cuba" (Document 582).