

POOR DOCUMENT

M C 2 0 3 3

THE SEMI-WEEKLY TELEGRAPH, ST. JOHN, N. B. JUNE 10 1839.

BICAMERAL SYSTEM.

PAPER READ ON THE SUBJECT AT ACADEIA COLLEGE.

The Two Legislative Chambers of British Origin and the Result of Peculiar Circumstances — The Advisability of Maintaining Two Houses An Open Question Still and Likely to Remain So.

WOLVILLE, June 7—The following address on the Bicameral system was delivered at the closing exercises of Acadia college here tonight:

Nearly all the countries possessing representative parliamentary governments have adopted in some form or other a system of government by which their parliament are divided into two houses, upper and lower—or two co-equals; and so, in considering this bicameral system we are at first deterred from forming anything but a favorable opinion of its adoption. We do not, however, attach enough importance to this to prevent us from judging the theory impartially, for in the first place no ideal form of government has as yet been discovered which is not seriously defective.

The real cause of this prevalence is not altogether that it has been adopted on its merits, as logically the best form of government to be obtained. The reason is, that it is original and development is essentially British, and has been entirely the result of circumstances. In earlier English history, and before the establishment of representative government, there were no assemblies, barons and bishops formed the only governing body. Later in the 13th century came the establishment of parliament, with the addition of those elements which form the basis of our constitution. This as of inferior rank were always held aloof from the aristocracy, and so parliament divided into two groups or estates. The prevention of a third estate was due to the distinction between the clergy to establish themselves as a separate body. It presents the fewest objections and insures the best results. In the United States the senators are elected for six years by the state legislatures, and the representatives for two years. Whether they should be chosen by the people at large or by a select body or number of bodies is an open question and does not materially affect the issue. The crucial point in the advantage obtained by this is the constant infusion of new blood, which, while it does not in the least affect the permanency and stability of the body, yet brings it in constant touch with the people, quickens its pulse and prevents any too great danger of stagnation.

In the same way the American senate has been likened to a lake which, while calm, deep and undisturbed, is yet being constantly drained of its waste material and water by the ever flowing streams. In the same way we may compare our own senate to the Dead Sea, which has no outlet, and from which the heavens alone can remove the water that has perverted its functions and is no longer fit for use.

In conclusion we may note that, after all, senate and house, altogether apply. The members of a popular assembly always have their constituents to consent. Then also the consciousness that there is another body, which is responsible as well as itself, and who are always ready to reprimand them if they act with less deliberation.

Let us consider the possible use of a second upper chamber. Mr. Cobbe said that an upper house was useful because it prevented the evil effect produced upon any body of power by the consciousness of having only himself to contend with. The same reason, he said, makes two consuls make two chambers desirable. It introduced the spirit of conciliation and took away from the lower house the feeling of absolute independence. This principle does not, however, altogether apply. The members of a popular assembly always have their constituents to consent.

The story of the German Hospital Society of Brooklyn will read with grief of the death of John Heit. He was born on March 11, 1813, in Klessingen, Bavaria, and came to this country in 1830. He was a cripple from birth, and was an invalid, hardly a day of his life passing without suffering and pain. In spite of this handicap he established a little tinsmith shop in Brooklyn, and by the time of his death had a fortune of about \$60,000.

Heit would come from business at his shop, and at his death this fortune had taught him the value of helping those in pain, then he gave his fortune to the hospital. His charities to the poor and unfortunate are well known. His charities to the poor and unfortunate are well known.

It must be in matters of less moment than revolutions over which any regarding chamber might have control. In such matters there are two classes made one based on the assumption that the upper house, the lower house, maintains that some power not directly responsible to the people is necessary to check rash impulses, which would lead to hasty or thoughtless legislation.

To the man born to give, everybody comes his way.

Public opinion sizes us up pretty well—it is not blinded by affection.

ALL HEADACHES

from whatever cause cured in half an hour by HOFFMANN'S HEADACHE POWDERS. 10 cents and 25 cents at all druggists.

not like but does not understand enough to forbear.

It would seem as though these two claims conflicted in principle, yet there are occasions when both apply. At a time when some national crisis, such as war, stir the whole people, and the lower house and the executive practically impeded by the emotion of public opinion, some restraining body composed of thoughtful men, who would be in a position to compel the nation to act considerably, would be of inestimable advantage.

The latter claim applies more frequently and is the more important. When measures come up that have not been properly submitted to the people, then it seems requisite that the nation's welfare should be appealed to men to whom, if necessary, an opportunity to express their opinion. The upper house would in such a case possess, as it were, a hypothetical power, "to hold the house of lords in total contempt," its object being to insure to the people direct voice in the affairs of state.

Granting the necessity of such a check on the action of the lower house, the question now arises: Can a body of men be provided capable of acting fairly and judiciously? In this capacity—a body whom the nation will respect and who will be above the suspicions of class or party, or even of personal interest?

On the method of selection and the character of the man selected depends the success or failure of the whole theory, and it is no small problem to provide a succeeds for the establishment of such a body.

In England the house of lords is mainly hereditary. This is the result of long established custom, and so is tolerated; yet many are against for changing hereditary ascendancy, as well as a composition of more than ordinary ability, and it is only by constant additions that the standard of the house of lords is kept up. Then again, as aristocracy meets class distinction, it prejudices against the mass and counter-weights on the part of the people.

To have the upper chamber appointed by the lower would raise the difficulty in a worse form. We experience this very fully in our Canadian legislature, where the bills are filed by the party in power, and the result is that the senate becomes extremely partisan in its nature. It is a mere recording chamber for the acts of the one party, and a source of obstruction to all acts of the others.

This objection would be overcome to an extent by limiting the terms of office to a certain number of years, say eight or ten. A bill could then be introduced which would remove the fewest objections and insures the best results.

In the United States the senators are elected for six years by the state legislatures, and the representatives for two years.

Whether they should be chosen by the people at large or by a select body or number of bodies is an open question and does not materially affect the issue.

The objection to this is that the senate becomes extremely partisan in its nature. It is a mere recording chamber for the acts of the one party, and a source of obstruction to all acts of the others.

This objection would be overcome to an extent by limiting the terms of office to a certain number of years, say eight or ten. A bill could then be introduced which would remove the fewest objections and insures the best results.

In the United States the senators are elected for six years by the state legislatures, and the representatives for two years.

Whether they should be chosen by the people at large or by a select body or number of bodies is an open question and does not materially affect the issue.

The objection to this is that the senate becomes extremely partisan in its nature. It is a mere recording chamber for the acts of the one party, and a source of obstruction to all acts of the others.

This objection would be overcome to an extent by limiting the terms of office to a certain number of years, say eight or ten. A bill could then be introduced which would remove the fewest objections and insures the best results.

In the United States the senators are elected for six years by the state legislatures, and the representatives for two years.

Whether they should be chosen by the people at large or by a select body or number of bodies is an open question and does not materially affect the issue.

The objection to this is that the senate becomes extremely partisan in its nature. It is a mere recording chamber for the acts of the one party, and a source of obstruction to all acts of the others.

This objection would be overcome to an extent by limiting the terms of office to a certain number of years, say eight or ten. A bill could then be introduced which would remove the fewest objections and insures the best results.

In the United States the senators are elected for six years by the state legislatures, and the representatives for two years.

Whether they should be chosen by the people at large or by a select body or number of bodies is an open question and does not materially affect the issue.

The objection to this is that the senate becomes extremely partisan in its nature. It is a mere recording chamber for the acts of the one party, and a source of obstruction to all acts of the others.

This objection would be overcome to an extent by limiting the terms of office to a certain number of years, say eight or ten. A bill could then be introduced which would remove the fewest objections and insures the best results.

In the United States the senators are elected for six years by the state legislatures, and the representatives for two years.

Whether they should be chosen by the people at large or by a select body or number of bodies is an open question and does not materially affect the issue.

The objection to this is that the senate becomes extremely partisan in its nature. It is a mere recording chamber for the acts of the one party, and a source of obstruction to all acts of the others.

This objection would be overcome to an extent by limiting the terms of office to a certain number of years, say eight or ten. A bill could then be introduced which would remove the fewest objections and insures the best results.

In the United States the senators are elected for six years by the state legislatures, and the representatives for two years.

Whether they should be chosen by the people at large or by a select body or number of bodies is an open question and does not materially affect the issue.

The objection to this is that the senate becomes extremely partisan in its nature. It is a mere recording chamber for the acts of the one party, and a source of obstruction to all acts of the others.

This objection would be overcome to an extent by limiting the terms of office to a certain number of years, say eight or ten. A bill could then be introduced which would remove the fewest objections and insures the best results.

In the United States the senators are elected for six years by the state legislatures, and the representatives for two years.

Whether they should be chosen by the people at large or by a select body or number of bodies is an open question and does not materially affect the issue.

The objection to this is that the senate becomes extremely partisan in its nature. It is a mere recording chamber for the acts of the one party, and a source of obstruction to all acts of the others.

This objection would be overcome to an extent by limiting the terms of office to a certain number of years, say eight or ten. A bill could then be introduced which would remove the fewest objections and insures the best results.

In the United States the senators are elected for six years by the state legislatures, and the representatives for two years.

Whether they should be chosen by the people at large or by a select body or number of bodies is an open question and does not materially affect the issue.

The objection to this is that the senate becomes extremely partisan in its nature. It is a mere recording chamber for the acts of the one party, and a source of obstruction to all acts of the others.

This objection would be overcome to an extent by limiting the terms of office to a certain number of years, say eight or ten. A bill could then be introduced which would remove the fewest objections and insures the best results.

In the United States the senators are elected for six years by the state legislatures, and the representatives for two years.

Whether they should be chosen by the people at large or by a select body or number of bodies is an open question and does not materially affect the issue.

The objection to this is that the senate becomes extremely partisan in its nature. It is a mere recording chamber for the acts of the one party, and a source of obstruction to all acts of the others.

This objection would be overcome to an extent by limiting the terms of office to a certain number of years, say eight or ten. A bill could then be introduced which would remove the fewest objections and insures the best results.

In the United States the senators are elected for six years by the state legislatures, and the representatives for two years.

Whether they should be chosen by the people at large or by a select body or number of bodies is an open question and does not materially affect the issue.

The objection to this is that the senate becomes extremely partisan in its nature. It is a mere recording chamber for the acts of the one party, and a source of obstruction to all acts of the others.

This objection would be overcome to an extent by limiting the terms of office to a certain number of years, say eight or ten. A bill could then be introduced which would remove the fewest objections and insures the best results.

In the United States the senators are elected for six years by the state legislatures, and the representatives for two years.

Whether they should be chosen by the people at large or by a select body or number of bodies is an open question and does not materially affect the issue.

The objection to this is that the senate becomes extremely partisan in its nature. It is a mere recording chamber for the acts of the one party, and a source of obstruction to all acts of the others.

This objection would be overcome to an extent by limiting the terms of office to a certain number of years, say eight or ten. A bill could then be introduced which would remove the fewest objections and insures the best results.

In the United States the senators are elected for six years by the state legislatures, and the representatives for two years.

Whether they should be chosen by the people at large or by a select body or number of bodies is an open question and does not materially affect the issue.

The objection to this is that the senate becomes extremely partisan in its nature. It is a mere recording chamber for the acts of the one party, and a source of obstruction to all acts of the others.

This objection would be overcome to an extent by limiting the terms of office to a certain number of years, say eight or ten. A bill could then be introduced which would remove the fewest objections and insures the best results.

In the United States the senators are elected for six years by the state legislatures, and the representatives for two years.

Whether they should be chosen by the people at large or by a select body or number of bodies is an open question and does not materially affect the issue.

The objection to this is that the senate becomes extremely partisan in its nature. It is a mere recording chamber for the acts of the one party, and a source of obstruction to all acts of the others.

This objection would be overcome to an extent by limiting the terms of office to a certain number of years, say eight or ten. A bill could then be introduced which would remove the fewest objections and insures the best results.

In the United States the senators are elected for six years by the state legislatures, and the representatives for two years.

Whether they should be chosen by the people at large or by a select body or number of bodies is an open question and does not materially affect the issue.

The objection to this is that the senate becomes extremely partisan in its nature. It is a mere recording chamber for the acts of the one party, and a source of obstruction to all acts of the others.

This objection would be overcome to an extent by limiting the terms of office to a certain number of years, say eight or ten. A bill could then be introduced which would remove the fewest objections and insures the best results.

In the United States the senators are elected for six years by the state legislatures, and the representatives for two years.

Whether they should be chosen by the people at large or by a select body or number of bodies is an open question and does not materially affect the issue.

The objection to this is that the senate becomes extremely partisan in its nature. It is a mere recording chamber for the acts of the one party, and a source of obstruction to all acts of the others.

This objection would be overcome to an extent by limiting the terms of office to a certain number of years, say eight or ten. A bill could then be introduced which would remove the fewest objections and insures the best results.

In the United States the senators are elected for six years by the state legislatures, and the representatives for two years.

Whether they should be chosen by the people at large or by a select body or number of bodies is an open question and does not materially affect the issue.

The objection to this is that the senate becomes extremely partisan in its nature. It is a mere recording chamber for the acts of the one party, and a source of obstruction to all acts of the others.

This objection would be overcome to an extent by limiting the terms of office to a certain number of years, say eight or ten. A bill could then be introduced which would remove the fewest objections and insures the best results.

In the United States the senators are elected for six years by the state legislatures, and the representatives for two years.

Whether they should be chosen by the people at large or by a select body or number of bodies is an open question and does not materially affect the issue.

The objection to this is that the senate becomes extremely partisan in its nature. It is a mere recording chamber for the acts of the one party, and a source of obstruction to all acts of the others.

This objection would be overcome to an extent by limiting the terms of office to a certain number of years, say eight or ten. A bill could then be introduced which would remove the fewest objections and insures the best results.

In the United States the senators are elected for six years by the state legislatures, and the representatives for two years.

Whether they should be chosen by the people at large or by a select body or number of bodies is an open question and does not materially affect the issue.

The objection to this is that the senate becomes extremely partisan in its nature. It is a mere recording chamber for the acts of the one party, and a source of obstruction to all acts of the others.

This objection would be overcome to an extent by limiting the terms of office to a certain number of years, say eight or ten. A bill could then be introduced which would remove the fewest objections and insures the best results.

In the United States the senators are elected for six years by the state legislatures, and the representatives for two years.

Whether they should be chosen by the people at large or by a select body or number of bodies is an open question and does not materially affect the issue.

The objection to this is that the senate becomes extremely partisan in its nature. It is a mere recording chamber for the acts of the one party, and a source of obstruction to all acts of the others.

This objection would be overcome to an extent by limiting the terms of office to a certain number of years, say eight or ten. A bill could then be introduced which would remove the fewest objections and insures the best results.

In the United States the senators are elected for six years by the state legislatures, and the representatives for two years.