

designed; so were all the works he saw raised by the Rebels, but not judiciously executed. The works could not be taken by assault or storm; they called for regular approaches. It would be a forlorn hope to commit naked men to storm redoubts, without fascines, scaling ladders, &c. If they had attempted, and got possession of the intermediate part of the lines, they could not live an instant in them, so long as the redoubts on the flanks were held by the enemy. They extended in front about two thousand yards, from the swamp on the left to the water. On being asked, if the 23d regiment and the grenadiers of the army might have penetrated, he said there was not room for a single man to pass between the end of the line and the swamp; but if the swamp had not been impassable, there would be no living for naked troops under the fire of the redoubt. The lines were evacuated in the night of the 28th, and he discovered it at four o'clock the next morning, with the patrol already mentioned. He saw the rear embarking, and several boats (four or five) passing over to York-island. The bringing up fascines, ladders, &c. would have been the work of some hours; and if they were at hand, he did not think that the lines could be taken by assault, without the hazarding a defeat, or at least purchasing a victory very dearly, and by a great loss of lives—nor, in any manner, in his opinion, but by regular approaches.

Relative to Washington's position, in the mountain above Quibbleton, he did not think it advisable to force its camp. He thought the risk and danger greatly outweighed the probability of success.

The General could take no new position, to draw Washington from his camp, without manifest hazard; the exposing of New-York, or of being cut off from his communications both with that city and the new-river.

The next evidence examined was Mr Mackenize, Secretary to Sir William Howe, relative to certain letters he had received; the one was from Gen. Burgoyne to Sir William, acquainting his Excellency of his arrival before Ticonderago; that he only waited for some heavy artillery, which was detained by contrary winds, and prevented vessels to cross the lakes to open batteries against that fortress; that as soon as he should be master of it, he would leave engineers behind him, to put it in an impregnable state: that he had been joined by a large body of Indians, and expected still a larger; that he intended to advance with all possible expedition to Albany; and that he was happy to inform his Excellency, that the enemy did not seem to have the least suspicion of any further object of his expedition than the reduction of Ticonderago.—This letter arrived at New-York the 17th of July, 1777, and was answered by Sir William Howe the same day, which was the last but one before the army sailed from New-York; the answer was, that he had heard of the surrender of Ticonderago; that he was going to the southward upon an expedition, which he thought would be a diversion in favour of the northern army; that if Washington should go to the north, and Gen. Burgoyne could keep him at bay for a while, he (Sir William) made no doubt but he should arrive time enough to hem Washington in: in the mean time he had given instructions to Sir Henry