of the word is "set apart." For this there seems to be the strongest authority in Calvin (Comm. on Gen. ii. 3), and Bishop Horsley (Sermons 22 and 23 on Christian Sabbath). See also the meaning of the word, as illustrated by Dr. Campbell (Dissertation VI., Part IV., prefixed to his Translation of the Gospels.) From this it is claimed by some, that there is no divine command for the *religious* keeping of any day of the week.

On the other hand, there are a large number of Christians who believe that the observance of Sunday is a divine appointment (see Hessey's "Bampton Lectures," which contain an exhaustive discussion of the whole Sunday question), among whom there are some who would have enforced it in the strictest manner; so that the early Connecticut statute before mentioned, would not be held by them too severe, nor the interpretation of the word "necessity" in Arkansas too narrow, *State* v. *Goff*, 20 Ark. 289; while others would have the legislation so shaped as not to make it obnoxious to the community.

It is difficult for any one who has read Dr. Whately's "Thoughts on the Sabbath" to escape his result—that the Lorrd's day has no connection with the Jewish Sabbath, and has no divine origin; neither was it established by the apostles, but by the Church. Those who are embraced in this class, for the most part hold that the religious observance of Sunday is most valuable for the moral nature of man, and that every assistance for its maintenance should be given it by the law. The Jews, Seventh-day Baptists, and other so called sabbatarians, think that the *seventh day* should be the one selected, and would call legislation to assist them in enforcing it. There are many qualifications, not alluded to, in the opinions which have been held, as to what shall constitute a proper observance of one day in seven; but those above stated are thought to give the main features of this many sided question. What manner of legislation will combine and reconcile them all, it is not easy to conceive. Perhaps the statutes of New Hampshire and Illinois would best, theoretically, meet the case. It will be remembered, that no labor in those States is allowed to the disturbance of others; but the case of *Varney* v. *French*, 19 N. H. 233, alluded to above, shows how narrow its terms may become by interpretation. Perhays if it were left to the jury to say what constitutes a "disturbance," the difficulty might, in a measure, be removed.—*American Law Review.*

THE TWO BRANCHES OF THE PROFESSION.

At the dinner of the Solicitors' Benevolent Association, Mr. Justice Hannen made use of the following expressions:—'I do not hesitate to enunciate my opinion that the two branches of the profession may well be amalgamated. No one knows better than myself that the duties of an advocate are entirely different from those of a solicitor; but, as in many other cases, I know of no means of drawing a sharp dividing line. They merge into one another, and a man who begins his career does not know, until he has been practising for years, for what he may have the greatest fitness, and I believe it would be well to leave it to a man to find out the opportunities that may arise of calling forth the particular qualities and talents that are in him, and so leave it to such occasions to develope whether or no he has a better capacity for carrying on the business of a solicitor or the profession of an advocate. I believe it is peculiar to England that the two branches are separated, and not only peculiar to England in its largest sense, but peculiar to this country, for in almost all of our colonies the two branches of the profession have been amalgamated. I am not aware of any inconvenience that arises from it, and there can be no better training for a young barrister, than to devote himself to the business of a solicitor.' The language of Mr. Justice Hannen is characterised by boldness. After his usual manner, having conceived an idea, he is ready to avow and defend his opinion. Moreover, His Lordship chose a most appropriate occasion and most proper audience for the enunciation of this deliberate judgment.

We propose to place before our readers some considerations on the expediency of the change proposed, and the facility which would be experienced in carrying it into operation. At the expense of being charged with a desire to 'Americanise' an ancient institution, an accusation sufficiently rebutted by the observation that our description is equally applicable to Canada and Australia, we think that we shall best put our case by showing how the system works in the United States, or rather perhaps in a given State of the Union; for example, the State of New York.

Every person who desires to practice as a lawyer in a State of the Union is 'admitted to the Bar;' and it is the rule that barristers form themselves into partnerships consisting of not less than three and of not more than seven persons. No deed of partnership is ever executed, but the members agree by parol, according to the common custom of almost all partners in business in America, in what shares the profits shall be divided. Every lawyer holds himself out to practice in every and to transact every department of legal business. Practically, partnerships are framed with the view of combining in one firm the varied kinds of ability necessary for the successful conduct of the several departments. So also, as might be expected, there is usually a disparity of age between the members, and a consequent disparity of experience. Therefore, if a client brings a bill of exchange for collection, the most youthful member undertakes the work, but if a client brings a Chancery suit of importance or a shipping cause of difficulty, the matter is handed over to the