

me that we are not going to prevent the Americans, whether we are inside or outside of a military alliance with them, from placing any of those ABM sites virtually wherever they want, whether it is outside Detroit, and thus endangering Windsor, or wherever it may be. I do not think they are going to imperil what they consider to be the effectiveness of their system merely because we do not want it too close to Vancouver. I really cannot see the strength of the argument that if we are inside the Alliance we are likely to gain that.

Mr. Groos: As someone who was formerly mixed up in this sort of thing, I disagree with you entirely. I think if it is to our joint advantage to have these moved somewhere else—if we can show that it is to our joint advantage—the Americans will be very quick to respond.

Professor McNaught: I would like to say just one further thing to your argument. Your basic assumption, of course, is that the emplacement of anti-ballistic missile systems can be considered somehow, if it is done rightly, to be to our joint advantage and, of course, really that is the basic point at which we disagree.

I do not, in fact, agree that even with the ABM thin system—or whatever the Americans call it now—we are enhancing our defence. You have heard a lot of evidence so far from people from the Hudson Institute and others about that, and when you are talking about saving 8 million people or 18 million, if you are going to kill 40, 50, 60, or 70 million I really cannot see much point in talking about the relative advantages.

Mr. Groos: To return to this point, since you returned to it yourself, I was arguing it from the other point of view, that whereas you may not be able to do much to enhance your own safety from the point of view of oncoming missiles without diminishing such safety as you are about to have, you could certainly diminish your safety from your own fallout or the fallout of the destruction of the oncoming missile by moving these elsewhere. Would that not appeal to you, not to have the fallout over Toronto or Montreal?

Professor McNaught: We are already going to have it over Toronto from the Bomarc's. You see, it is a question of what one's estimate is of what is going to happen in the event of a nuclear war because there is not going to be any fallout unless there is a nuclear attack, and despite the variations in Herman Kahn's War Games and the rest of it, I do not feel that anybody, in fact, is likely to survive in any populous Canadian centre if there is a nuclear attack and this again, I suppose, is basically where we would differ.

Mr. Groos: Thank you.

The Chairman: Do you have a supplementary, Mr. Gibson?

Mr. Gibson: Do you not feel that you are attributing complete bad faith to the United States, considering Canadian defence interests as well as their own, in taking that position?

Professor McNaught: No, I am not really. What I am saying is that I do not believe that it is our defence interest that is being considered. I believe that the faith is perfectly good faith with the people who presumably are doing that planning; people who will trust a Canadian deputy commander of NORAD at Colorado are acting in good faith. Certainly it is not a question of good faith; it is a question of the interpretation of the reality of the situation. I just do not believe that gives us defence no matter how good the faith is.

The Chairman: Mr. Lewis?

Mr. Lewis: Professor McNaught, as you know, even though I cannot accept your final conclusion my position is closer to yours than that of other members of the Committee. It seems to me that there are some elements in your argument that ought to be investigated a little more closely.

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Is it realistic to speak of the Warsaw Pact as the same kind of alliance as the NATO pact? Is the Warsaw Pact, in fact, much more than a piece of window dressing for a military system with headquarters in Moscow which existed before the Warsaw Pact was nominally created and which would exist tomorrow if the Warsaw Pact were officially dismantled?

Is it not also a fact that when you are talking about the Warsaw Pact, because of what I have just said—if it is valid and I think it is—you cannot be talking about any member of the Warsaw Pact withdrawing. The invasion of Czechoslovakia last August is the latest example, but you did not really need any example. Yugoslavia is the one country that succeeded and it succeeded probably because it came so soon after the first rape of Czechoslovakia and before the eastern situation hardened to the extent that it has since.

One knew perfectly well that if any member of the Warsaw Pact tried to withdraw from that military—it is not really an alliance—tie-up aside from any formal alliance they would be invaded, they would be stopped, whereas I think it is still true to say despite the criticisms of American policy which you make in your paper and with which I almost entirely agree, it