

the sixteenth session of the General Assembly, just a few months ago. What is required now is early action to bring this recommendation into force.

The sixth example: The United States programme and the Soviet draft treaty both call for reductions of conventional arms in the first stage. The Soviet plan provides for reductions proportionate to manpower cuts. At our second meeting, the representative of the United States put forward new proposals calling for a reduction by 30 per cent. My delegation believes that this development brings the views of the two major military powers closer together. Detailed negotiations should begin at once to remove remaining differences.

My seventh example is as follows: In the crucial field of nuclear disarmament the positions of the two sides have likewise been brought substantially closer by the significant new United States proposals for a 30 per-cent reduction of nuclear weapons delivery vehicles in the first stage. The Soviet draft treaty calls for the complete elimination of all such vehicles in the opening stage. Nevertheless, having in mind the magnitude of the initial cuts proposed by the United States, as well as the agreed principle of balance, my delegation believes that detailed negotiation should bring the two major military powers to agreement on phased reductions in this field.

### Second Type of Problem

In these seven areas, and there are probably others, we believe that an appreciable measure of common ground already exists. There is a second category of problems in which there remain more pronounced and generally well known differences between the two sides. I shall not dwell on them today, with the exception of the vital issue of stopping nuclear-weapons tests, which requires special mention.

Canada deeply regretted that the Soviet Union last August broke a three-year moratorium on testing for we are opposed to all nuclear-weapon tests. In this we share the view of most other countries. Indeed, the major nuclear powers themselves have stated at this very conference that they would like to see all tests stopped. However, they now find themselves unable to reach final accord owing to disagreement on inspection. Is there no alternative to another series of tests with all the harmful consequences that such action could bring? It is not possible, within the framework of this committee, to make the further effort which is required to break the deadlock? In my opinion, such an effort must be made, for otherwise the prospects of this conference itself could be seriously threatened. We already see, in dispatch after dispatch, stories that this disarmament conference is doomed to failure. These stories are based on the talks on nuclear-weapon tests which have taken place between the nuclear powers and in which the other representatives at this conference have not been involved at all. In the minds of the public the impression has been created, because of the disagreement