

of powers with nuclear weapons and capacity, what stronger assurance could any state without nuclear weapons have, short of becoming an ally of one of the nuclear powers?

PURSUIT OF PEACE

The Canadian Delegation also considers it significant that the nuclear powers — including the two most powerful nations in the world — have agreed not only on the terms of a draft treaty but also to render immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, in the event of a threat to the security of those countries which renounce the possession of nuclear armaments. Surely this in itself is one of the most encouraging international developments in many years. It represents a great step forward in the pursuit of durable world peace.

As its second main purpose, the proposed Treaty will serve as an initial but essential step toward the control and reduction of existing stocks of nuclear weapons. It has been suggested by some that the undertakings on the part of the nuclear powers to proceed with nuclear disarmament are insufficiently precise. Yet it is to be noted that the nuclear powers who sign this Treaty make a firm declaration of intent to work for nuclear disarmament. Moreover, the review and withdrawal procedures in the draft text provide means for the non-nuclear parties to exert influence on the nuclear parties to live up to that declaration.

HALTING THE ARMS RACE

The race to produce nuclear armaments must be stopped; eventually these weapons must be eliminated. On this the nations here assembled are agreed.

It has been argued that we should be more likely to halt the arms race if the states not having nuclear weapons were to refuse to become party to a non-proliferation treaty unless it included a clause under which the nuclear powers would commit themselves to cut off further production of fissile material, nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. But in the light of the history of disarmament negotiations, would other nations really credit a treaty undertaking by the nuclear powers to stop the production of nuclear armaments and, if so, when — in one, three or five years time? Is it reasonable, in the present world situation, especially in view of the refusal of France and China to take part in disarmament negotiations, to expect the nuclear powers now to make any stronger commitment than they have made in Article VI of the present draft?

The answers to both questions are likely to be negative, however much we might wish them to be positive. If the history of efforts to achieve arms control or disarmament agreements teaches anything, it is to put progress ahead of perfection. The measure which we are now discussing — a partial measure just one step on the long road to general and complete disarmament — has taken seven years to accomplish. To wait for the nuclear powers to make a commitment to reduce nuclear arms is to run the risk of jeopardizing early agreement to stop dissemination....

INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS

Fundamental to the effectiveness, acceptability and implementation of the Treaty would be its safeguards provisions in Article III, which will not only serve to ensure that the Treaty is being observed by all parties (making it a credible and durable instrument) but to extend and consolidate international safeguards procedures, thereby facilitating exchanges and co-operation in the peaceful nuclear sphere. While the Canadian preference was for safeguards to apply to nuclear as well as non-nuclear parties, we believe that the recent unilateral undertakings by the United States and the United Kingdom to accept the same international safeguards as non-nuclear parties will help to establish balanced and equitable safeguards procedures.

It is also our view that the fears expressed by some that the draft Treaty may entail economic inequities have little foundation. On the contrary, the development of nuclear energy for peaceful uses and the trade in nuclear material could be stimulated by the very international confidence and co-operation the Treaty would inspire. The undertakings in Article IV constitute a kind of charter of rights in the sphere of nuclear science and technology for developing countries, which does not exist now and which would be of great potential benefit to them.

The only restriction of any significance on non-nuclear countries in the field of peaceful use would be the prohibition of nationally-conducted nuclear explosions for engineering and other civil purposes. Canada accepts this prohibition as necessary to the fundamental purpose of the Treaty because peaceful and military explosions are technologically indistinguishable. In our view, Article V, offering peaceful nuclear explosive services to all non-nuclear parties at nominal cost, is a reasonable and economical alternative.

SHARED RESPONSIBILITIES

During recent discussions, much has been made of the idea that the Treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations as between the nuclear and non-nuclear states. No one can quarrel with that principle. We think that principle is fairly reflected in the draft Treaty. I suggest only that the text before us should be judged in terms of whether a better balance is attainable at the present time, given the basic difficulty of reconciling the positions of the nuclear haves and have-nots.

We are also aware of the argument that the Treaty is an instrument which could perpetuate the monopoly position of the states now possessing nuclear weapons. In a sense it is. That is an inescapable aspect of a non-proliferation treaty. This Treaty does demonstrate, however, that the nuclear powers are becoming increasingly aware of the great responsibility that rests upon them and are demonstrating a willingness to respond to the anxious advice tendered by the vast majority of the non-nuclear states to negotiate a cessation of the nuclear arms race....