

III Introduction and Assumptions

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The context in which arms control operates has changed: from bilateral issues to multilateral concerns, from fixed positions reflecting East-West alliances to fluid, ad-hoc coalitions based on shifting relationships. The United Nations — once abused as paralyzed by capricious states — is now energized by multinational mandates and an effective Security Council. Yet despite hopeful phrases such as “a new world order,” the changing world remains disorderly and unstable with its little wars and emerging proliferators. Indeed, the concept of uncertainty seems to be replacing the concept of the threat.

In this world, with its regional tensions and the disturbing spread of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, the next ten years will be a very uncertain period. The assumptions which follow speak to the period between 1992 and 2002 set the context in which verification synergies will be discussed. They are not necessarily listed in a priority order. They do not pretend to predict the unpredictable: no analyst would have been able to predict the date and the manner in which the Soviet Union would break up ten years before the event. Indeed, they assume that international events will continue to unfold without major “sea changes” such as that event.

Assumptions About Constraining Proliferation (1992-2002)

Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Delivery Systems

1. The NPT will be extended indefinitely when it comes up for review in 1995, and its verification measures will be strengthened. The IAEA will use its authority to conduct “special inspections,” i.e., suspect site inspections. The UN Security Council will consider strong sanctions against violators of the NPT and may be able to apply some pressure on the non-signatory states. With the momentum created by the inclusion of China, South Africa, and other states, and the already-agreed-upon entry of Belarus, Kazakhstan,

and Ukraine as non-nuclear weapon states, the NPT will be successful in slowing nuclear proliferation, but it will be unable to stop it.

2. The Chemical Weapons Convention will enter into force, and it will be an agreement which serves the security interests of most countries. The degree to which the CWC verification regime provides effective verification will be seriously challenged; however, it will set a precedent for intrusive verification backed by UN Security Council pressures and actions.
 - Requirements to destroy CW stockpiles will stir national and international debates about cost, location of destruction facilities, and environmental standards for destruction.
 - The list of countries developing or acquiring chemical weapons for future use will increase despite the CWC; these countries will not necessarily be signatories of the CWC.
3. Similarly, some countries will develop biological weapons despite the BTWC, whether or not they are signatories of the BTWC.
 - The BTWC will remain inadequately verifiable, but additional confidence-building measures such as exchange of information and invitational inspections should increase confidence that the majority of the signatories are compliant with the convention. Verification synergies will be of particular importance in this area of arms control.
4. Many advanced countries, including the United States and Canada, will expand their programs in chemical and biological defences for troops and civilian populations in response to the proliferation of these weapons.
5. As called for in the START follow-on agreement, the United States and Russia will reduce their deployed strategic offensive

