

includes the CGDK, China, ASEAN and a large number of Western powers including the US and Canada. Since Vietnam was initially responsible for invading Kampuchea it is the anchor of the first coalition; its interests and objectives dictate to a greater or lesser extent the behaviour of both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of Kampuchea. Relations between Hanoi and the Heng Samrin government in Phnom Penh are relatively easier to define than those between Hanoi and Moscow. The Heng Samrin Government is in effect the puppet of Vietnam, to which it is bound by the peace and friendship treaty of 18 February 1979. This treaty lends legitimacy to the presence of the Vietnamese troops and incorporates Kampuchea as part of the *solidarité indochinoise* of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea. The Heng Samrin regime is completely subservient to the Vietnamese government and has no choice but to collaborate and to place both troops and supplies at its disposal.

Although the Cambodian people were undeniably glad to be rid of the Pol Pot regime they are not prepared to go on showing gratitude to their Vietnamese liberators forever. In addition, as Nayan Chanda points out, the Vietnamese have not made any great effort to counteract the traditional animosity which the Cambodians feel towards them.²⁰ As time goes on the Kampuchean army seems to be less and less enthusiastic about the struggle against the guerillas, and it is the Vietnamese soldiers who have to bear the brunt of the war.

The Vietnamese leaders are well aware of how unpopular they are in Cambodia. One of those to whom I spoke in Hanoi acknowledged quite frankly that "no country is content to be occupied by foreign troops." But he claimed to be confident, nonetheless, that Kampuchea would take over its own defence when the Vietnamese troops withdrew as promised in 1990. He told me that in 1945, "we had 5,000 men when we began the war; by 1990, the date on which we withdraw our troops, Kampuchea will have had the time to acquire a real army to defend itself."²¹ The Vietnamese are even more embarrassed if one raises the subject of their military presence in Laos since it cannot be explained in terms of internal

²⁰ Nayan Chanda, *Brother Enemy. The War After the War*, *op.cit.*, page 370.

²¹ Interview with the President of the *Institute of International Relations*, Hanoi, July 1987.