

war in the South Atlantic involving the British, the Lebanese conflict, Israeli/Lebanese/PLO conflict, the Iraqi/Iran war, and we'll see about Chad - there has been a good deal of caution in the way the super powers have conducted themselves. Again a matter which we can discuss. I am talking only about today, not about tomorrow or next week. Those are some of the better bits of news looking back at 1970.

The not so good news is that the military balance between the West and the Soviet Union has shifted adversely from the western standpoint. It isn't correct, by the way, that as far as the United States is concerned, the size and number of nuclear weapons has constantly increased. They have constantly decreased but their sophistication has increased. The question of whether sophistication makes those weapons less likely to be used is an open question - not just philosophical - but the very size and the destructive capacity of American weaponry has declined. That has not been the case with the Soviet Union. We tend to think, and your paper in your package tends to imply, that there is a virtue in nuclear parity. While there may be some virtues in nuclear parity, whatever that means precisely, but one thing nuclear parity does not do is to sustain the strategy the West has employed for the last thirty-five years in the defence of Europe. Reference was made to the problems of reliance on nuclear weapons, a product, no doubt of American nuclear advantage in the 50s, in the 60s, but that's gone, and consequently some important pillars of western strategy with respect to the defence of Europe, not just in war time but the defence of Europe in the psychological and political sense, are very much open to re-examination, and this is not some law of nature, it is