

various countries, would be greatly affected if we were to achieve the degree of confidence which would enable us to effect even part of the programme of disarmament which is now technically within our reach.

Because we cannot have all the disarmament that is theoretically conceivable, should we not have now at least that large measure of the disarmament which is feasible now and which would be so helpful to the world politically and economically? It would not even be necessary to proceed with all the disarmament which would be technically enforceable now to achieve the most far-reaching transformation of international scene. In this case it can truly be said that we should not allow "le mieux d'être l'ennemi du bien".

My third proposition relates to the establishment of warning systems against the danger of a sudden attack. The U.S.S.R. recognizes this danger and this requirement. Mr. Bulganin's proposals of July 21 last provide for the establishment of control posts, for instance. The difficulty is that the Soviet Government does not agree as to the timing of the introduction of such a system. While we envisage the organization of an alarm system as a prelude to a disarmament programme, the U.S.S.R. insist that such an arrangement should be part of a broad disarmament scheme. That is not the original position that it took.

If we were agreed that a comprehensive disarmament programme which could effectively be controlled were to be implemented, it seems to be that it should not prove to be too difficult to specify in the agreement the nature of the machinery which would be required to give adequate warning against sudden attack and the proper time to introduce it in a generally acceptable scheme.

We fully agree with the U.S. Government that Soviet acceptance of the Eisenhower proposal would have contributed to a lessening of tension, that it would have increased confidence and made further progress easier in the field of disarmament. We still hope as suggested in our draft resolution that the U.S.S.R. will appreciate the advantages offered by the Eisenhower plan and that it will not turn down the opportunity of doing now what will have to be done later, in any case, as part of the comprehensive programme it recommends. If the U.S.S.R. is not prepared to agree, it does not follow necessarily, in our opinion, that a limited but effective agreement on disarmament could not be negotiated and that such an agreement cannot provide at the appropriate moment and in the appropriate fashion for an early-warning system as envisaged by the U.S. In the absence of a general political settlement, however, we must recognize that the task is more difficult and that confidence building measures such as the Eisenhower plan would facilitate the initial and most difficult steps on the way to disarmament and by the same token create a more favourable atmosphere for the settlement of political issues.

In spite of the temporary disarray caused by the disconcerting scientific limitations in our capabilities of control, it appears to us that in the field of disarmament the scope of negotiation and early action is considerable. Within the inescapable and recognized political and technical limitations it remains open to us to develop the kind of agreement which would achieve some of the essential purposes