

Before leaving he asked me if I had received any word from Tokyo about the Minister we were sending, as to whether he would be acceptable. He himself had had no word. I explained to Yoshizawa that the only word I had sent Japan was that we had a certain person in mind and would be, in all probability, sending a name in a few days. I explained that we had arranged to have Brigadier General Foster¹ here tomorrow, that being the one day on which it was possible to get Col. Ralston and others together to make the necessary arrangements as to his leave, etc. Yoshizawa was not too sure whether, in existing circumstances, the government would wish to receive a Minister. He did not put it in those words, but indicated it was doubtful whether events, as they had shaped themselves, might not make a difference.

In the course of our conversation something was said about trade being cut off between the two countries. I told him that in this connection we had decided to give the 12 months notice required to end our adherence to the British trade treaty with Japan. That I thought the legal view would be that notice having been given by the British government, the abrogation of the treaty by that government would end our adherence to its provisions or obligations under them. But that I had drafted a letter to give him formal notice, from our government, in the matter. This I handed to him and he read it in my presence. His only comment was that it was the logical step in view of the action we had taken in freezing Japanese assets and also he himself thought that the ending of the British treaty would end ours. He had expected this particular action. I told him that of course it did not follow that the agreement would necessarily lapse. I hoped that events in the interval would enable us, before the 12 months were out, to probably work out a treaty of our own. I thought it was better to have separate treaties anyway than to be joining with other parts of the Empire in their treaties.

He had remarked earlier that what was done at the Conference of 1932 had really been the beginning of the unhappy developments in trade matters. He had not much hope of a treaty being continued, once notice had been given. He had worked for one or two years in the States trying [to] prevent the notice that had been given by the United States of the abrogation of their treaty, from preventing altogether another treaty but had not been successful.

When we were conversing, I told him we did not intend to prevent the ship that was loading grain at Vancouver from completing its cargo and leaving. He said at once he was very pleased to know this as for some time they had been applying for clearance papers and could not get them due to some routine. I said that Robertson and I had had a word on this together earlier and that I was able to give him the assurance that so far as that particular shipment was concerned, matters would be as I had described.

¹ Ministre désigné au Japon. Voir le volume 7, les documents 145-155.

¹ Minister-Designate to Japan. See Volume 7, Documents 145-55.