

gross absurdity to infer, that men are *not injured*, because they have a power to petition for *redress*; that Parliament *can* be called severe, not only when when they *refuse* a just complaint, but whenever they give foundation for one; but I will suppose with Hortensius, that the constituents apply for their Members,—is their application to be disregarded? are the Commons to deny them redress? are they to continue the suspension? If they are, then the grievance remains; the constituent remains without a Representative, or a power of choosing one. On the other hand, do the Commons recall the suspension? If they give the constituent *redness*, they confess that he has been *aggrieved*. They concur with me in pronouncing the complaint to be well founded. The grievance, indeed, may be redressed, but does it follow from thence that it was *no* grievance. The Members, indeed, may be restored, but, *quæ fuit causa reditus, nisi fuit injusta discessio*. But Hortensius points out to us afterwards, *another* mode of redressing the electors, namely, the *expulsion* of the Members; I omit to consider, whether it be constitutional to punish a man twice for the same crime, but let Hortensius recollect, that if the House choose this mode of redressing, they establish the very position which I assert, and which he denies; to wit, that expulsion is the more lenient measure to the constituent; so much so, that the one is the *evil*,