

sonnel will be beaten while the material is still available.

If the future struggle arises before the Canadian vessels are ready, the men can always be placed at the disposal of the Mother Country. There are many distinguished and clever men who say that the next trouble will arise in 1912. On that point I express no opinion; but what I do say is that apart from building ships, Canada, by training and supplying men to the Mother Country, will be rendering her the greatest assistance possible. Between now and 1912 there is no time to build dreadnoughts or other ships, but there is time to enlist and partially train men. Wiping 1912 out of consideration, everything must have a beginning. Rome was not built in a day and neither was the Imperial navy. This is the commencement of the Canadian navy, and it is bound to take time to spring into being. What the future may have in store nobody can tell, and what this beginning may ultimately lead to it is impossible to guess. Now, I hold no brief for the Canadian Government; I am talking as a naval officer. The Government's policy as regards the navy may be right, it may be wrong, but this I do say, and say with all the earnestness I can command: This policy has been framed by the representatives of the people and is now law. Criticise the programme by all means; but do not let that criticism take the form of placing obstacles in the navy and also dragging the navy into party politics. Apart from anything else, the navy should be separated from and above party politics. The Canadian navy is a branch of the service of the Empire and as such it is the duty of all Canadians and the whole of Canada to assist by their utmost endeavour in making it a great success and an efficient service.

He concluded with these words:

I again repeat that it is the duty of every one of us to assist in the making of this branch of the navy, no matter how big or how small it may be, a thoroughly efficient force, so that it may be ready at any time to take its place with the remainder of the naval forces for the defence of the Empire.

That was Commander Roper's opinion in 1910. Without amplifying what I have said about the suspicious character of the statement read to the House, dated September 20, 1911, I may point to the fact that in the speech, extracts from which I have just read, the Minister of Marine and Fisheries is refuted out of the mouth of his own officers, and he and his fellow members are condemned for the tactics they have pursued with regard to a Canadian naval policy.

Mr. LEMIEUX: Will my hon. friend allow me to add that after September 21, 1911, I had occasion to meet Admiral Kingsmill, who was in charge of the Canadian Naval Department, and he expressed the utmost regret that the Laurier naval policy would not be carried out.

Mr. MURPHY: In placing men as the first requirement in a navy, Commander Roper not only had the authority of Lord

Charles Beresford to support him, but also the authority of the Right Hon. Winston Churchill, the present First Lord of the Admiralty. In a letter addressed to his constituents, Winston Churchill said:

Four cardinal errors, each more stupid and vicious than the other, require exposure. The first is the attempt to measure the strength of the British navy, or any other navy, in dreadnoughts alone. Men, guns and ships are all necessary to a navy, none can be dispensed with. But of these the first, most decisive, most capacious factor is men. All calculations in machines apart from men are vain. It is to the officers and men of the British navy, to their virtue and seamanship, that the safety of this Empire must primarily be confided.

The Minister of Marine and Fisheries also told the House that recruiting was not popular, and that even if we had the ships we could not get the men to man them. Once more let me appeal to the records and show this House and this country how little the Minister of Marine knows about the documents contained in the archives of his own department. In the report of the Department for the Naval Service for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1911—that is covering the period when the late Government was in power and had charge of the Canadian Naval Service—he will find on page 8 that Admiral Kingsmill, after speaking of the purchase of the ships Niobe and Rainbow says:

On the arrival of the ships at Halifax and Esquimalt, respectively, recruiting was started. By arrangement with the Post Office Department postmasters were appointed recruiting officers in seventy-five (75) cities and towns in the Dominion; posters were exhibited throughout the Dominion and a recruiting pamphlet was widely distributed. As a result recruiting has been satisfactory, and the complement of the Niobe is practically complete, whilst there are still a few vacancies in the Rainbow. As the advantages of the service become more widely known, it is anticipated that there will be no difficulty in obtaining recruits.

That is one side of the picture: Let us look at the other, when the blight of the hon. gentlemen's advent to power had settled down on this Canadian naval service. If you take the report of the same department for the year 1912 you will find at pages 8 and 18 the same statement repeated in these words:

Owing to the uncertainty of the future naval policy and the limited accommodation available, no special efforts have been made to obtain recruits for the navy.

Under the Liberal regime recruiting had been satisfactory; under the regime of our friends opposite, owing to the uncertainty of their naval policy, no special efforts have been made to obtain recruits, and the condition is, of course, unsatis-

Mr. MURPHY.