

Beyond this the United States I believe would like to get as much storage as possible in Canada and as close to the border as possible. The Canadian objective in the beginning was primarily to maintain its flexibility and freedom to develop and operate its Columbia river as it may see fit during changing circumstances from time to time. I would say this is a fundamental objective.

A secondary objective from the Canadian point of view, and this is an objective which was entertained during treaty negotiations, is to maximize the amount of energy in the form of downstream benefits which would be returned from the United States. Later this objective changed. It changed between the negotiation of the treaty and the negotiation of the protocol. The secondary Canadian objective shifted from maximizing the return of power to Canada presumably to maximizing the dollar profit from the transaction. In other words, there was an attempt to get the maximum amount of money over our expenses that was possible with a minimum objective in respect of paying for the storage. I believe the secondary objectives are to some extent in conflict with what I call the fundamental objective. I think this is one of the things that may have led to a considerable amount of confusion.

There is another long section here summarizing the treaty which perhaps I will pass. I think what I have done up to now is spend a fairly long period on relatively few pages, but in response to Mr. Byrne's comment, this is a random process, and I find in the course of these remarks which amplify what I said on page 14 I have covered a great deal of the remainder of the presentation.

I might add that I have made a recommendation in respect of flood control dealing with the language in protocol 1. It would require a fairly lengthy period to explain this, Mr. Chairman, and perhaps I can do that in response to a question.

I should perhaps state also that I have rewritten page 80 and distributed copies of the corrected version to some of the members. The data on pages 82, 83 and 84 result from the use of shortcut methods owing to my attempt to get this brief in the hands of members early enough that they could read it before my appearance.

I stand substantially behind what is stated there in terms of principles and magnitudes, but I have had an opportunity in the past week of carrying out a slightly more detailed analysis and I would be happy to present that if the question arises.

Mr. CHATERTON: Mr. Chairman, some of us do not have the corrected copies of page 80.

Mr. HIGGINS: There are some copies on the table although I do not believe I have a sufficient number for all of the members, Mr. Chairman.

At this point, Mr. Chairman, I think I have covered most of the essential matters which I have attempted to deal with in this brief in a general way and I would now like to read into the record just the conclusions which appear on page 89:

The provisions of the Columbia river treaty of 1961 and protocol of 1964 are so interwoven that it is doubtful if they could be amended to produce a treaty which would protect Canada's legitimate interests and meet urgent requirements in the United States.

Other arrangements could be made quickly involving the building of Mica creek dam, Dorr dam and the Bull river dam (for ultimate incorporation in the Bull river—Luxor reservoir).

The treaty arrangements contain grave legal, economic and political defects.

In the interests of friendly relations with the United States in the long run, and the safeguarding of irreplaceable Canadian assets for future