

It is on such a plane that Canada can best play a creative role. But how close are we to it? Clearly, we have not yet reached a point of stable international balance, let alone international harmony. Evolution in that direction has gone perhaps far enough to demand adaptation of our policies, but we must not confuse identification of a tendency with its fulfillment.

Let us examine the nature of that evolution as it affects the Communist world. It is essential to define one's own view of that evolution before suggesting the policy implications for Canada and other Western countries. As I have said, the monolithic unity of the Stalin era is obviously long gone. The Sino-Soviet rift seems irreparable, short of a profound change of policy amounting to a de facto surrender by one side or the other to the ascendancy of its rival. The rift has been a lever which certain East European Communist countries, notably Roumania, and some non-ruling Communist parties, have used to enlarge somewhat the area of their independence from Soviet control.

This independence is real, if as yet sharply limited. It extends to some national cultural expression, with modest affirmation on its distinctness, especially from that of Russia; to some economic autonomy, with assertion of limited national control over planning; to a degree of divergency over political issues within the Communist world; and to the development of intellectual and trade relations with the West.

But it is to be noted that this independence stops short of any significant departure from the general line of Communist policy toward the non-Communist world. The most that can be said is that, having smaller resources and fewer vested interests elsewhere in the world than the Soviet Union itself, the East European countries are able to reap many of the advantages of the strategy of peaceful coexistence in its positive aspects, while avoiding serious involvement in those aspects which entail risks of conflict with the West, and specifically the strategy of wars of national liberation.

This is by no means the same as saying that the political unity of the Soviet camp has been seriously undermined. Neither the East European leaders nor the Soviet Union are prepared to allow that. The East European leaders seek to enlist for themselves the same support the regimes in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia enjoy, through the same appeal to nationalist sentiment which those regimes can make. Originally imposed from outside by Soviet bayonets, they are trying within the limits of strict adherence to the basic tenets of Marxist ideology to legitimize themselves by identifying their regimes with national interests, as far as they can. Because of their economic insufficiencies the most pressing of these are economic. But there is no necessary correlation between economic reform and political reform domestically, nor between variety of economic system and variety of political approach to the outside world.

Clearly, therefore, polycentrism in the Warsaw Pact area has not destroyed the cohesiveness or the essential Communism of the regimes. This is not surprising. The appeal to national sentiment was never intended to achieve this result. On the contrary, by attempting to strengthen the