

security in the area. Surely there must be no return to the conditions, if we can avoid it, which helped to provoke the initial military action. That has been the position of our Delegation from the very beginning of the Assembly's consideration of this grave question.

I said on the night of November 1-2:

"The armed forces of Israel and of Egypt are to return to the Armistice lines, where presumably ... they will once again face each other in fear and hatred ... What then, six months from now? Are we to return merely to the status quo ante? Such a return would not be to a position of security, ... but would be a return to terror, blood-shed, strife, incidents, charges and counter-charges, and ultimately another explosion."

That remains our feeling on this matter. This feeling has also been reflected in resolutions on this subject which the Assembly has already passed and which Canada has supported.

It is an essential part of our work, then, not only to bring about a military withdrawal, but also to do what we can to avoid the restoration of a situation of disturbance, unrest and incidents which might require the United Nations to intervene all over again in the future in order to stop new fighting. The Secretary-General's report recognizes this danger. It refers to the resolution of November 2 which states the obligations of the parties to withdraw but which requires them also "to desist from raids across the armistice lines and observe scrupulously the provisions of the Armistice Agreements". It refers also to the resolution of November 4, which goes beyond mere withdrawal.

Furthermore, as the Secretary-General states, certain of those related aspects of compliance will assume added importance once the military withdrawal is effected. Even now, however, we cannot, I suggest, ignore these related aspects in dealing with this question. Therefore, in asking the Secretary-General to report back, it is my hope that he will report on those other matters with suggestions to the Assembly on what can and should be done.

The Secretary-General has already indicated that study might be given to the "question of the extent to which UNEF might assume responsibilities so far carried out by the Truce Supervision Organization". That truce organization certainly has not itself the power or authority effectively to interpose itself between the forces of the two conflicting parties. The UNEF, however, would now be effective for this purpose and, following closely the Israeli forces, could be deployed in the area of the demarcation line from the Mediterranean to the Gulf of Aqaba, where it would function in order to prevent incidents, to keep the peace, and to make "secure"