

reconceived completely in non-zero-sum or cooperative terms. When such reconceptualizations have occurred, however (such as in the Camp David peace process, or in post-Cold War Southeast Asia), cultural differences are not far from the surface and their potential as obstacles to progress cannot be underestimated. In Southeast Asia or Latin America, where the legacy of war and violence between states is somewhat less, issues of style and process still remain extremely important elements in efforts to construct a stable regional order.

Finally, one of the most important aspects of these cases is the attention they draw to how different the security concerns of various regions really are. This is again well understood by regional specialists, but much less often acknowledged by security or arms control specialists. Hence, in Southeast Asia for example, the main concerns that drove the ASEAN members to cooperate have been related to internal security, and the conceptual "glue" for cooperation has been (as Amitav Acharya points out) a more comprehensive vision of security that is tied closely to ideas of regime (and social) stability, nation-building and economic progress. In Latin America, internal security is also vastly more important than inter-state conflicts, although the nature of the internal security concerns have been very different than in the Southeast Asian case. In the Middle East, by contrast, classic inter-state issues are intertwined with fundamental questions of regime security or survival. All of these differences affect how important (or not) classical NACD issues are considered, relative to other kinds of threats and challenges.

Orientations towards Regional Relations

Underlying images of the region and regional security (who is "in," who is "out" and who poses the greatest threats), and of the nature of cooperation between states, also often affect orientations towards NACD issues. These mental maps often have a cultural dimension, both in how they define the boundaries of the region (is Australia an Asian state; are Poland and Romania part of the "West"?), and in how they define the relations among the members of the region. Thus, for example, in Southeast Asia the "ASEAN way" is seen as emerging from a common cultural heritage (derived from, but not exclusive to, Indonesian cultural traditions of consensus decision-making and a blend of an Islamic and Confucian heritage). But it is also driven by the explicit goal of political elites of coping with diversity and preserving some "corporate" harmony among themselves, while managing conflicts between them often by sweeping them under the carpet. This leads, as Amitav Acharya points out, to a tendency to "think multilaterally, but act bilaterally," and to keep regional cooperation within a flexible framework that facilitates a form of bilateral relations that is nested in, compatible with, and constrained by, the overarching framework of multilateral norms.

In Latin America, on the other hand (and as Hal Klepak points out), the sense of regionalism is relatively weak, despite the occasional pan-American rhetoric. The region is better understood as a patchwork of sub-regions, characterized by a great deal of competition between major states (Brazil, Argentina, Mexico), and a political heritage of authoritarianism. As a result, the overall framework of multilateral norms in Latin America is relatively weak, and does not englobe bilateral relationships very tightly. By contrast, China may be described as "thinking unilaterally, pursuing issues bilaterally, and posturing multilaterally," in part because "historically, multilateral security measures either were alien to Chinese rulers (they were more accustomed to bilateral, tribute-system ways of dealing with foreign states) or failed to protect Chinese security interests."⁸ The Chinese stance towards multilateralism is mirrored by

⁸ Jing-Dong Yuan, "Culture Matters: Chinese Approaches to Arms Control and Disarmament," 84-85.