

16. To be most effective, a CCW verification regime would have to apply to non-international as well as international conflicts as it is generally acknowledged that it is in the course of the former that landmines are most frequently used in an indiscriminate and inhumane fashion. While limiting the scope of the Convention/Protocol and its verification regime to international conflict might be necessary in the short run, ultimately the greatest humanitarian returns will be realised if it is extended to cover non-international armed conflicts as well.

### C. *A Incremental Approach to Effective Verification*

17. An effective CCW verification system is only possible once all states are confident that such a system will not have harmful consequences and that it will in fact provide net benefits.

18. Experience in the realm of arms limitation and disarmament strongly suggests that the development of such a perception can best be achieved by initiating a confidence-building process. The goal of confidence-building in this context would be to build trust between all parties to the regime, reassuring everyone that the operation of the Convention/Protocol and its verification system would provide net benefits to all.

19. As confidence-building measures begin to produce results, more ambitious verification measures can then be implemented. As the benefits deriving from these measures are realised, and as all parties come to recognize the advantages of a more effective verification regime, more rigorous measures can be gradually introduced.

20. This suggests the utility a phased or "incremental" approach, in which a verification regime could develop along two axes. First, there could be a gradual strengthening of verification with respect to *international* conflict. Second, there could be an incremental extension of the verification regime to *non-international* conflicts.

21. Such an incremental approach would have two principal advantages. First, it would help eliminate one of the more commonly cited disincentives to becoming party to the Convention/Protocol. It is generally accepted that universality is an important goal of the Review Conference; for the more states that can be brought into the Convention/Protocol, the greater the potential humanitarian payoff. Against this backdrop, the argument is sometimes made that an effective (and especially an intrusive) CCW verification regime is undesirable because it would tend to deter some states from signing on to the Convention/Protocol.

22. In the event that an effective verification mechanism *might* deter some states from becoming parties to the Convention/Protocol an incremental approach could prove useful. Such an approach is premised on a simple assumption: that each step toward effective verification must be predicated on achieving broad agreement among